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The Evaluation of EU Aid to ACP Countries is  part of a general evaluation of EU aid requested by 
the  Development Council  in  June  1995.  The  second  phase  of the  study  focuses  on:  (i)  policy 
formulation~  (ii)  policy  dialogue  between  the  EC  and  individual  ACP  states;  and  (iii)  aid 
implementation and management. 
The country reports look at policy dialogue and aid implementation in six countries and one region 
concentrating on 2-3 sectors of European Community assistance in each country. The present report 
is  on Tanzania.  The other six reports cover Zimbabwe, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroun,  Liberi~ Jamaica 
and  the East Caribbean.- The sectors  studied itrTanzania-are  sttactutal- adjustment,  transport and 
education. 
This report is based on the findings from a visit of a team of consultants to Tanzania undertaken from 
March 12 to March 25,  1998.  The fieldwork was preceded by an analysis of available evaluations in 
the sectors of concentration as  well as  other available documents on EC Aid to Tanzania.  The in-
country fieldwork was organised around: 
•  the review of project files~ 
•  interviews with EC Delegation staff; 
•  interviews with Government officials; 
•  interviews with Member States and other donors' representatives; 
•  interviews  with beneficiaries and NGOs; 
•  wrap-up meeting with Member States; and 
•  wrap-up meeting with Delegation staff. 
The draft report was presented in  May  1998 to  the Working Group of Heads of Evaluation Services 
(Development) of the European Union and the Commission. 
The  evaluation  team  is  grateful  for  the  support  of the  EC  Delegation  and  the  collaboration  of 
Government officials and donor representatives, particularly the Member States. 
C.  Montes 
ACP Evaluation Field Phase Coordinator 
Those  wishing to  obtain copies of the synthesis repon or the  other case studies should contact the 
Head of  the Evaluation Unit,  Common Service Relex of  the European Commission. Executive Summary 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A. Country Context 
Tanzania has the third lowest per capita GDP 
in  the  world.  Almost  40%  of  Tanzanian 
households  are  unable  to  meet  their  basic 
needs. 
Tanzania's  economy  is  highly  dependent  on 
the  agricultural sector (80%  of employment), 
which  is  based largely on  smallholdings.  At 
independence  in  1961,  Tanzania  had  a  weak 
infrastructure and a weak industrial base.  In 
1967,  after a few  years of a relatively liberal 
development  strategy,  Tanzania's  frrst 
President,  Julius  Nyerere,  opted  for  self-
reliance and ujaama, Tanzanian socialism.  By 
the  mid-70s,  the  economy  was  experiencing 
severe problems.  In  1986, a new Government 
embarked  on  an  Economic  Recovery 
Programme (ERP),  supported  by  the  Bretton 
Woods  institutions  and  other donors.  In the 
last 10 years, reform has been most successful 
(albeit  slow)  in  liberalising  the  foreign 
exchange and agricultural markets.  Financial 
reform  has  proved  particularly  difficult. 
Reform in other sectors has been hampered by 
the  weakness  of  institutional  capacity  and 
political  will  on  the  part of the  Government, 
and  by  the  weak  and  uncoordinated  donor 
support  to  the  Civil  Service  Reform 
Programme. 
Low  pay  and  institutional  weakness  in  the 
civil service in Tanzania have both contributed 
to Governance problems.  The misuse of donor 
counterpart  funds  and  tax  exemptions 
contributed  to  strained  relations  between 
Tanzania and its donors in  the early and mid-
1990s.  Soon  after  his  election,  President 
Mkapa appointed a Commission  of Inquiry to 
analyse  the  issue  of corruption.  This  report 
detailed  instances  of  corruption  in  most 
sectors  of the  economy, and its  findings  and 
recommendations  have  been  widely 
discussed. 
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Despite  more  than  a  decade  of  structural 
adjustment  programmes,  Tanzania  is  one  of 
the most aid-dependent countries in the world, 
with the ninth highest aid to GNP ratio (almost 
30%).  Tanzania  has  received  ODA  worth 
abour US$3o- billion {in  1995 dollars) over the 
last thirty years.  Aid from EU Member States 
and  the  EC  accounts  for  half  of  total  aid 
received  by  Tanzania  in  the  three  decades 
since 1966.  The relative importance of EC aid 
has increased steadily, and it now accounts for 
10% of total European aid to Tanzania. 
EU-Tanzania  co-operation  began  in  1974. 
Support  under  the  frrst  three  Lome 
Conventions  concentrated  mainly  on 
agriculture/rural  development  and  transport. 
Under Lome IV, structural adjustment became 
a  major  element  in  the  Community's 
Programme. 
A few  trends in  EC assistance have emerged 
over time:  (1) EC aid has grown substantially; 
(2)  there has been a shift from project aid to 
programme  support,  with  the  latter  growing 
from  1  Oo/o  to  40%  of  total  commitments 
between  EDF6  and  EDF7;  and  (3)  within 
project  aid,  health  and  education  have 
attracted growing EC support, while transport 
has remained the key sector for EU assistance 
to Tanzania. 
EC  aid  is  managed  jointly  by  the  National 
Authorising Officer (PS  Ministry of Finance) 
and the EC.  The NAO office is supported by 
the  EDF  Programme  Support  Unit  (PSU). 
This  unit  is  staffed  by  local  and  foreign 
consultants (see aid implementation). 
The  EC  Delegation  in  Tanzania  appears  to 
have been under-staffed, given the size of its 
programme  and  the  need  to  supervise  12 
regional  co-operation  activities  and  30 
operations  funded  by  , budget  lines. 
Delegation  advisers  operate  without  clear 
tenns  of  reference,  and  there  is  often  a 
mismatch  between  .,kills  and  assignments. Executive Summary 
Opportunities to  work  with  headquarters  and 
other  Delegations  are  limited.  Delegation 
staff  are  over-burdened  by  complex 
administrative tasks,  which  are carried out at 
the  expense  of  policy  dialogue  and  the 
supervision  of key  programmes.  Delegation 
staff  noted  their  insufficient  budgetary 
resources  as  an  important  constraint.  The 
main problem in dealing with Headquarters is 
the  long  chain  of  decision  making  (most 
decisions being taken at Headquarters). 
The  large  number  of donors  can  make  co-
ordination  difficult.  According  to  a  recent 
study,  there  are  40  donors  and  up  to  2,000 
separate projects.  Donor co-ordination varies 
from  sector  to  sector,  and  in  some  sectors 
there  has  been  intense  donor  competition. 
Development  aid  co-ordination  meetings  are 
held monthly, and there are twenty Donor Co-
ordination  working  groups  and  sub-groups. 
However,  the  effectiveness  of  donor 
coordination is limited. 
The  twelve  Member  States  that  have 
diplomatic  missions  in  Tanzania hold  regular 
meetings  for  coordination.  Most  EU  co-
ordination  meetings  are  aimed  at  sharing 
information, while work on joint operations is 
less frequent. 
Several  factors  are  responsible  for  weak 
coordination, both among EU Delegations and 
with other donors.  These factors  include: the 
Government's institutional capacity; the weak 
organisation of some of the regular meetings; 
and  the  different  developmental  approaches 
and institutional set-ups among donors, which 
differ  in  terms  of  both  staffing  and  the 
decentralisation  of  decision-making  power. 
As  a  result  of the  last  factor,  informal  co-
ordination  among  "like-minded"  donors  (e.g. 
Nordic countries) appears more effective than 
formal co-ordination. 
B.  Policy Dialogue 
Indicative  Programming.  The  introduction 
of  the  Strategy  Paper  · has  strengthened 
programming  analysis,  particularly  through 
the  inclusion  of  sectoral  evaluation  lessons. 
However,  this  document  still  underestimates 
programme  risks.  For  example,  it  is  over-
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optlnusttc  with  regard  to  governance  issues 
and  to  the  institutional  achievements  of the 
Integrated Roads Programme and SASP.  The 
choice of education as part of the second focal 
sector  suggests  an  underestimation  of  the 
Delegation's capacity constraints. 
The  Government  appreciates  its  increased 
participation in the NIP exercise. However, in 
Tanzani~ given  the  weakness of institutional 
structures,  ownership  of  the  programming 
process is always difficult to achieve. 
Tanzania  has  been  under  BWI  structural 
adjustment  programmes  for  more  than  10 
years.  The policy dialogue on macroeconomic 
stabilisation, market and public sector reforms 
has been led by the BWI.  During most of this 
period,  monetary  and  fiscal  IMF benchmarks 
have  been  missed.  The BWI have gradually 
introduced  more  conditionalities  to  micro-
manage  change  in  Government  institutions. 
BWI  programmes  have  generally  been  too 
ambitious  and  have  underestimated  the 
limitations  of the  Governments'  institutions. 
Donors have not provided sufficient support to 
the Civil Service Reform. 
The  Government's  policy  dialogue  with  the 
BWI is  affected by  its  institutional weakness 
and  by  its  dependence  on  external  aid.  The 
micro-management  introduced  by  the  BWI 
partly  explains  why  the  Government  often 
agrees  to  conditionalities  which  it  knows  it 
will not be able to implement.  Furthermore, in 
some  cases  ci vii  servants  are  contracted  by 
donors to be consultants in sectoral work.  All 
these  factors  may  compromise  Government 
ownership of the reform programme. 
It  was  therefore  difficult  for  the  EC' s 
Structural  Adjustment  Support 
Programme to achieve its goals of supporting 
social expenditures and their budgeting.  The 
EC programme underestimated the difficulties 
in  achieving  institutional  changes  in  the 
budget,  in  the  absence  of  adequate  co-
ordination with the Civil Service Reform and 
with  other  donors.  The  monitoring  of 
developments  in  the  economic  reform 
programme  and  in  social  sector  expenditure 
and budgeting was limited by the Delegation's 
staffmg constraints.  The EC  was  not  able  to Executive Summary 
participate meaningfully in Public Expenditure 
Review exercises. 
In the Roads Sector, with the introduction of 
the Economic Recovery Programme in  1986, 
the  rehabilitation  of  the  country's  roads 
became  a  priority.  Preparation  for  the 
Integrated Roads Project (IRP) started in mid-
1987  with  a  series  of studies  to  determine 
what actions would be needed to improve the 
condition of rural  roads.  When  the  IRP was 
prepared,  policy  dialogue  and  institutional 
strengthening  were  provided  by  the  World 
Bank.  The  EC  focused  instead  on  road 
construction,  which  is  its  traditional  area of 
expertise.  The  IRP was  launched  in  March 
1991. 
Until  recently,  the  IRP  was  perceived  as  an 
early  and  successful  attempt  to  implement  a 
sectoral approach.  However, the IRP is  now 
showing  its  institutional  weakness.  The 
Government  has  faced  severe  difficulties  in 
maintenance  of  the  road  network.  A  crisis 
between donors and the Government arose in 
mid-1996  when the  Government decided not 
to allocate resources to the Road Fund, so that 
it  could  meet  IMF  conditionalities.  The 
Delegation  co-ordinated  a  response  from  all 
major  donors  (except  the  World  Bank) 
requesting  the  Government  to  release  the 
funds.  By the end of the fiscal  year,  96% of 
funds  designated  for  the  IR.P  had  been 
released. 
The  IR.P  was  designed  before  the  debate  on 
sector wide approaches started and  it did not 
benefit  from  the  lessons  emerging  from  this 
debate.  In  particular, a key precondition for a 
sector-wide  approach  was  missing  as  the 
capacity  of the  Ministry  of Works  and  the 
Ministry  of  Communications  and  Transport 
was minimal.  The design of the IRP wrongly 
assumed that with T A support the Ministry of 
Works  would  become  an  effective 
implementing agency. 
The importance of institutional  strengthening 
has now become central to policy dialogue in 
this sector.  Since the discussions in  1996, in 
which donors were primarily concerned about 
the  availability  of  resources  for  the  Roads 
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Fund, donors have now shifted their focus to 
understanding how these funds  are used,  and 
to emphasising the need for capacity building. 
Because of the improper use of funds, the EC 
co-ordinated  a  letter  from  all  major  donors 
advising  the  Government  on  the  need  for 
institutional  reform,  particularly on the need 
for a Road Agency.  As a result, the President 
set  up  an  Inter-ministerial  Task  Force  to 
oversee  the  IRP,  and  appointed  a  new 
Pennanent Secretary in the Ministry of Works. 
In  the past, the EC has  been involved in the 
education  sector  through  a  human  resource 
development  project  and  through  SASP 
activities.  However,  given  the  difficulties 
associated with a project-based approach, the 
EC  decided  to  move  to  a  sectoral  approach 
(sector development programme)  in  order to 
improve the effectiveness of interventions.  As 
seen  in  the  transport  sector,  there  are  many 
difficulties in adopting this approach when the 
Government's capacity is limited.  Moreover, 
institutional  support  and donor co-ordination 
are even more difficult in a "soft sector" with 
many  fragmented  (and  often  competing) 
donors.  The  Delegation  was  supposed  to 
support  the  sector  development  programme' 
and to co-ordinate Member States'  activities, 
but had very limited resources. 
EC policy dialogue in the education sector was 
one  factor  behind  the  Government's  formal 
adoption  of a  sectoral  approach.  However, 
problems have been caused by  the  weakness 
of Government  institutions,  the  low  pay  of 
Tanzanian civil servants, the large number of 
donors in the sector, and the limited staffmg of 
the EC in the educatibn sector.  T'l this context, 
most in-country donors believe that there has 
not  been  sufficient  emphasis  on  donor 
co-ordination in the EC programme (or in the 
Government's  sector  development 
programme).  Instead, there has been too much 
emphasis  on  fmancing  new  quasi-
governmental  structures  and  technical 
assistance.  However,  all  in-country  donor 
representations noted that the Delegation has 
recently  played  an  extremely  effective  co-
ordinating role. Executive Summary 
Governance, Poverty, Gender and 
Environment 
The  Tanzania  NIP  explicitly  recognises  the 
importance of the poverty criteria and notes its 
importance  at  sectoral  level.  Some 
programmes  have  tried  to  address  poverty 
issues  directly.  An  innovative  programme  in 
this  area has been Stabex. Stabex funds  have 
been used to  support coffee farmers  directly, 
and  they  have  spent  these  funds  mostly  on 
food, school fees and coffee inputs. 
The Government and most donors understand 
the importance of Governance and corruption 
issues  in  Tanzania.  We  found  that  most 
donors  recognise  the  significant  and  visible 
role  played by the EC Delegation  in  keeping 
these issues on the agenda.  Governance issues 
have  mainly  been  addressed  through  support 
for  increased transparency and accountability 
in public administration. 
The environmental manual has been helpful in 
determining  the  need  for  environmental 
impact assessments during project preparation. 
However, a recent evaluation found that, in the 
past,  environmental  impact  assessments  had 
not been widely carried out in Tanzania. This 
situation  has  begun  to  improve  in  recent 
transport  and  water  projects.  The  gender 
manual  appears not  to  have  been as  effective 
in operational tenns. 
Aid Implementation and Management 
The EC  has provided about 5%  of all  official 
development assistance received  by  Tanzania 
in  the  last  thirty  years.  The decline  in  NIP 
disbursements  has  resulted  from  the 
completion  of most  works  under  IRP-I  and 
from  the  delayed  implementation  of  the 
second phase of the  IRP.  Stabex  and  SASP 
funds have risen in importance since 1992. 
The EDF Programme  Support Unit  (PSU)  to 
the  National  Authorising  Officer  (NAO) 
started operations in  1994,  with a staff of 20 
and  funding  from  an  EDF  project.  The 
objectives of the PSU are to facilitate close co-
operation  between  the  NAO  and  the 
Delegation, and to  support the  administration 
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and  implementation  of  EDF-funded  . 
interventions in Tanzania. 
The PSU has  had difficulties in carrying out 
its  functions  adequately.  Accounting  and 
monitoring  controls  appear  to  be  we~ 
particularly  for  SASP  counterpart  funds. 
These deficiencies are currently in the process 
of being reviewed. 
In the transport sector, aid implementation has 
been  affected  by  the  constant  change  of 
implementation  arrangements.  There  have 
been  frequent  changes  in  the  ministry,  and 
units  involved  in  the  implementation  of the 
IRP  have  proliferated.  The  fragmented 
distribution of responsibilities has led to slow 
decision  making  and  to  extremely  weak 
accountability. 
Preparation 
The  introduction  of  the  Project  Cycle 
Management  and  the  logical  framework 
approach  has  done  much  to  improve  project 
preparation in the EC.  However the difficult 
institutional  context  in  Tanzania  creates  a 
number  of  challenges.  A  recent  capacity 
assessment study on Tanzania found  that too 
much  of the  initiative  in  the  selection  and 
design  of  government  projects  lies  with 
donors.  EC  projects  and  programmes  are 
often  based  on  the  work  of  external 
consultants who  are not sufficiently aware of 
the  Government's  limited  institutional 
capacity  or  of the  EC'  s  staffing constraints. 
As a consequence, some projects are based on 
unrealistic assumptions. 
In the transport sector, there has been a clear 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  fmancing 
proposals, in part the result of the introduction 
of  a  transport  manual.  For  example,  the 
Ruvuma  and  Southern  Iringa  Roads 
Maintenance Programme fmancing agreement 
includes  monitoring  indicators,  and  biannual 
audits  by  an  independent  auditing  company 
were  made  mandatory.  Transport  projects 
have  also  become  more  specific  in  policy 
conditions and more supportive of the policy 
dialogue in the sector. 
In  some  cases  the  EC  allocates  insufficient 
manpower resources for project preparation in Executive Summary 
complex projects. Government participation is 
often limited by its capacity constraints. In the 
Structural  Adjustment  Support  Pro-
gramme,  the  Government  often  had 
insufficient  staffmg  to  examine  the 
programme in detail. The design of the SASP 
was  innovative and focused on a key  priority 
area (social sector budgeting).  However, time 
and  manpower  constraints  of  EC  officials 
resulted  in  limited  co-ordination  with  the 
Government, and in the underestimation of the 
difficulties  involved  in  managing  and 
monitoring  the  SASP.  Similarly,  the 
Education  sector  development  programme 
was  also  prepared  with  limited  manpower 
resources compared to similar interventions by 
other donors. 
In common with other donors, the assumptions 
made  during  project  preparation  are  often 
over-optimistic.  In the  transport sector,  the 
assumption  by  the  Integrated  Roads 
Programme  that  TA in  itself (mostly  World 
Bank)  was  going  to  strengthen  Government 
institutions  in  the  sector  underestimated  the 
difficulties  of  capacity  building  in  Africa. 
Similarly,  the  SASP  goal  of improving  the 
social sector budgeting was  overly dependent 
on the Government remaining on track in  the 
reform  programme,  the  overall  budgetary 
process being improved, Civil Service reform 
improving  sectoral  capacities  and  effective 
donor co-ordination. 
Implementation 
As  with  most  donors  in  Tanzania,  it  appears 
that  many  EC  projects  have  suffered  from 
delays  in  implementation.  A  check of three 
transport  projects,  using  the  reference  time 
limits  set  out  in  the  detailed  evaluation  by 
Price Waterhouse  in  1992,  shows  that  delays 
were  longer  than  the  reference  limits. 
Procurement  was  also  subject  to  delays. 
However,  procurement  delays  in  the  World 
Bank  component  of  the  Integrated  Roads 
Programme appear to have been longer. 
Implementation  and  monitoring  of  EC 
interventions  have  been  affected  by  the 
extensive  nature  of  EC  ex  ante  financial 
controls. In this context, much less emphasis is 
given to  monitoring project performance or to 
ex post financial audits.  The EC is required to 
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apply  ex  ante  fmancial  controls  without 
selectivity.  A change towards more selectivity 
in the application of these controls would save 
valuable  EC  staff  time.  For  example,  NIP 
projects under EDF6 and EDF7  required 844 
procurement decisions. However, only a third 
of this total number of procurement decisions, 
those above ECU 100,000, accounted for 96% 
of the total value.  As economies of scale in 
procurement  and  disbursement  decisions  are 
minimal,  a  move  towards  removing  ex ante 
controls  for  procurement  decisions  below 
ECU 100,000, while extending fmancial audits 
to  all  expenditures  under  EDF  funded 
programmes  would  save  considerable  staff 
time. 
The  efficiency  cost  of  extensive  ex  ante 
controls can also be seen in  the processing of 
payment  orders  for  every  expenditure.  We 
estimated that the amount of time spent just on 
processing payment orders in  one year is  2.1 
person  years at the Delegation and 1.4 at the 
NAO office. 
Technical Assistance 
Technical  assistance  (including  short  term 
consulting  services)  has  assumed  growing 
importance in EC aid to  Tanzania.  Technical 
assistance  accounts  for  20  percent  of  the 
estimated  net  ODA  from  all  donors  to 
Tanzania. 
However,  the  impact  of technical  assistance 
seems  to  have  been  limited.  The  T  A 
programme in  the SASP, which was  aimed at 
improving budgeting in the social sectors, had 
limited success.  The success of other donors 
has  also  been  limited  in  this  area.  The  1997 
evaluation of the Integrated Roads Programme 
found that, despite over 320 man-years of TA, 
the institutional improvement strategy had not 
been successful. 
The  difficulties  in  donors'  Technical 
Assistance programmes in Tanzania are linked 
to  the  Government's  limited  capacity  to 
manage  and  monitor  these  programmes.  In 
many  cases,  the  T  A  is  perceived  by 
Government as an additional conditionality of 
an aid package and is not adequately managed 
or  supervised.  In  this  context,  while  T  A  is Executive Summary 
nominally  provided  to  support  the 
Government,  in  many  cases  (given  the 
Delegation  staffing  constraints),  the  TA  is 
more  effective  in  supporting  central  EC 
activities.  This  dual  responsibility 
(Government and  EC)  can  often  ~ompr?~se 
the  effectiveness  of  the  TA  m  bmldmg 
capacity in the Government. 
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Ex post evaluations are a strength of EC  aid. 
However, while some of the lessons of recent 
evaluations have been included in the Strategy 
Paper,  it  has  been  difficult  to  feed  these 
lessons  into  the  design  of  new  operations 
(although  this  has  been  happening  in  recent 
road projects). We were informed that there is 
a considerable backlog in project evaluations. Oaeofthe 
·lowest per 
capitaGDPs 
in the world. 
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CHAPTER I.  COUNTRY CONTEXT 
A.  Country Background 
Country Details 
Tanzania has an area of 945,000 square kilometres bordered by Kenya and Uganda to 
the north;  Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west;  and 
Zambia and Mozambique to  the south.  , With a population of 30  · million growing at 
2.5% per annum, Tanzania's per capita GOP of US$120 (1995) is the third lowest in the 
world.  About 36% of Tanzanian households are unable to afford basic needs.  Tanzania 
is both one of the ·most populous and one of the least urbanised countries in Sub-Saharan 
~ca.  · 
Tanganyika was colonised by Germany and then ruled by Britain, frrst as  a League of 
Nations Mandate, and later as a UN Trusteeship Territory.  It achieved independence in 
1961.  Zanzibar  became  independent  two  years  later,  after  a  violent  coup  had 
overthrown the minority Arab Govemme~t  to which  Britain had transferred its authority 
over the island.  In April  1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar agreed to form the .United 
Republic  of  Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar,  renamed  United  Republic  of Tanzania  in 
October 1964. 
Table 1-Main Features of Tanzania's PoUtlcal System 
1 • ;  ~;;. ·  ~ ~<:"';, :  '.~:,.~ ~~~~~1:{~jfn~::~_·:~~ i :f!)  ·., -t-~~~·  <~?!:'i;  ::· 0•  ::·)··~: •  , :  :·  \·, ·;,.-.  ~:··  ....•. t..  ·y _  ... ~:3T  1': :f"  ·!~·  :~-~~?~ ~·.:·~;r~~'ti~T~~ 
;  -..:  ~- '.'  ~-~~  »  ~  ... ~::~:,::~ ;;,  :~~ "~;  ~',·:~;.~.:.'~it~·~:.".,; ......  ]~\' ~.L~·:: ,· -~:: .. >  .. '  A  "«<"» ·' '  ·.-:d.  ,, ~· "'"J_.::;<;·fC~i~f~~t~:i 
Independence  Tangan~:~~nwer9,  1961 
Zanzibar: December 19, 1963 
Constitutional Structure  Executive Presidency 
Single-Chamber Parliament 
Parties represented in Parliament  CCM (Ruling Party): 186 elective seats 
Opposition Parties: 46 elective seats 
Opposition Parties  CUF, NCCR, UMD, CHADEMA, DP, UDP 
I 
The Interim Constitution of 1965 established the rule of a single party with its.  clause on 
"single party competitive elections".  Only in  1992  was  the  Constitution amended to 
allow for multi-party elections.  The frrst multi-party elections were held in 1995.  The 
· Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) or,CCM won a large majoritY of. seats in 
mainland Tanzania. Results in Zanzibar, which has a s~parate Parliament and President, 
were close and accusations of electoral frauds  were widespread.  Overall, Tanzanian 
opposition parties are small, poorly funded and poorly organised but the media is fairly 
active and independent.  . 
Tanzania has played a prominent role in African· foreign affairs, panicularly in the Great 
Lakes  Region.  Its  war with  Uganda in  1978  led  to  the  overthrow  of the  Idi  Amin 
regime.  More recently, Tanza11ia has played an important part during the Rwanda and 
Burundi  civil  wars  and  has  been  a  major  destination  for  tnany  refugees  from  both 
countries. 
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The Economy 
Tanzania's economy is highly dependent on the agricultural sector,  provid~g 80% _ of 
_ employment, 58% of  GDP and 85% of exports.  Tanzanian agriculture is based largely 
on smallholders tilling plots of less than 2 hectares and is oriented towards food crops 
(particularly maize) and livestock.  The main exports are coffee, cotton, cashew nuts, 
cloves, tobacco, sisal ,and minerals (especially gold). 
At independence, Tanzania had little developed infrastrUcture,  and a fragile industrial 
base.  During the mid-60s,  difficult relations with the USA,  UK and Germany led to 
closer links with China and Eastern Europe.  In  1967, after a few years of a relatively 
liberal development  strategy~ Tanzania's frrst President, Julius Nyerere, embarked on a 
development  strategy,  based upon  self reliance and  'ujaama,'  --Tanzanian  socialism. 
The relatively open economy became increasingly closed: companies were nationalised, . 
import  restrictions  and  foreign  exchange  controls  were  introduced  and  preferential 
treatment was  granted to  co-operatives and socialist villages.  At the time,  the World 
Bank and many other donors strongly supported these strategies which many felt were a 
model for other African countries. 
Table 2 • Key Economic Indicators 
By  the  ~d 1970s,  the  economy  was  experiencing  severe  problems.  Successive 
emergency economic recovery plans did not bring growth or support from aid agencies. 
In 1986,  th~ new Gov~mment  decided to embark on an Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP), supported by the Bretton Woods Institutions and other donors.  The ERP aimed 
at transforming Tanzania into a market-oriented economy.  In the last 10 years, reform 
has  been  most  successful  (albeit  slow)  in  liberalising  the  foreign  exchange  and 
agricultural markets.  Financial reform has proved particularly difficult.  Reform in other 
sectors has been hampered by the weakness of GoT institutional capacity and the weak 
and uncoordinated donor support to the Civil Service Reform Programme
1
• 
Although  Tanzania has  liberalised external trade and  payments,  domestic  prices  and 
agricultural  marketing,  some  segmentS  of the  economy are  still  dominated  by  public 
sector monopolies.  Parastatals accounted for 13.7% of GDP and·  30% of gross domestic 
-fixed  investment in -1991.  While privatisation has  somewhat reduced the  role of the 
S~te  in the economy ,since then, all the largest parastatals are still under State control. 
, 1 Tanzanian civil service belongs to the "low wage" classification, Ian Lienert, IMF Working Paper 97, 1997 
Decade of  Civil Service in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Governance and Public Administration. 
In  Tanzania  there  is  consensus  among  donors  and  the  Government  that  very  little 
progress  can  be  achieved  without  addressing  the  Civil  Service  Reform.  However, 
donors'  track  record  in  capacity  building  among  local  institutions  is  poor.  During 
structural adjustment, the trend towards reduction in the real wage of civil servants and 
wage compression has  continued.  Even after recent retrenchments,  the  Civil  Service 
remains  overmanned,  but  offers  poor  work  incentives,  while  seminar  and  travel 
allowances (especially if donor-financed) distort efficient work decisions. 
The Civil Service Reform Programme was  begun in  1991  but progress has  been slow. 
Until  recently,  the  BWI emphasis  has  been  on  the  reduction  of the size of the  Civil 
Service,  and  less  on  improving  efficiency  or  delivering  better  service
2
•  The  Civil 
Service Reform is supported by  a few donors, however, and given the magnitude of the 
task, all major donors should support this programme. 
The  low  pay  of the  civil  service  and  the  weakness  of institutions  in  Tanzania,  have 
contributed to  many Governance problems. The misuse of donor counterpart funds and 
tax collection contributed to  the strained relations between Tanzania and its donors in 
the early and mid 1990s.  Soon after his election in  1995, President :Mkapa appointed a 
Commission  of Inquiry to  analyse the issue of corruption.  This report (also known as 
the W  arioba report) 
3  detailed instances of corruption in  most sectors of the economy 
and its findings and recommendations have been  widely discussed. 
There  is  a  consensus  in  the  donor community  that  instances  of corruption  are  still 
widespread.  This was openly discussed in  the  last meeting of the Consultative Group 
(Dares Salaam, December 1997).  Some of these malpractices are presented each year 
in  the Annual Report of the Auditor General.  Some of the examples contained in  the 
Warioba.and the Auditor General's reports relate to  the sectors of concentration of this 
study and in a few instances to EC projects (e.g. cost overruns in two road projects). 
B.  The Management of International Aid 
In-Country Aid Agency Representations 
All  major  donors  and  international  organisations  are  represented  in  Dar es  Salaam. 
Based  on  1996  net  official  development  assistance  (DAC  data),  the  European 
Commission  is  the  eighth  largest  donor  after  Japan,  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany and Norway.  (See  Figure 1.) 
2  Norad,  Nordic  Initiative for  Assistance to  Civil Service Reforms,  March  1995, Civil Service Refonn in 
Tanzania. 
3  Presidential  Commission  of Inquiry  Against  Corruption,  Repon of the  Commission  on  Corruption, 
November 1996. 
IDC - August 1998  11 Aid 
dependency is 
high, and the 
EU as a whole 
accounts for 
half of aid to 
Tanzania 
Chapter I  Country Context 
Figure 1 • Distribution of Net ODA among donors (1996) 
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Twelve EU Member States have diplomatic missions in Tanzania.  The organisation of 
each  donor  representation  is  different.  The  Netherlands,  for  example,  has  fully 
decentralised  decision  making  on  aid  management.  Other  donors  with  a  more 
decentralised  set up  include  DFID  (whose  office  in  Nairobi  covers  three  countries), 
DANIDA, and SIDA.  Centralised structures however seem to be prevalent. 
Role and Importance of  International Aid. 
Despite more than  a decade of structural adjustment programmes, Tanzania is  one of 
the most aid dependent countries in the world, with the ninth highest aid to GNP ratio 
(almost 30% of GNP). Tanzania has received ODA worth almost US$30 billion (in 1995 
dollars) over the last thirty years, equivalent to eight times its 1995 GOP.  International 
aid to  Tanzania is now back to  the level it was  twenty years agv.  There was a steady 
growth of aid between 1966 and 1982 when the Government was trying to implement a 
strategy of "African socialism". After severe economic problems became evident, donor 
support for Tanzania started to  weaken and aid declined for all  of the first half of the 
1980s.  After the IMP-supported Economic Reform Programme was launched in 1986, 
donor support resumed again.  However, the problems in fiscal management in 1993 led 
to  a loss of donor support as  evidenced by the decline in net ODA between 1992 and 
1995. Aid flow has started to grow again with the election of the new government. 
As  shown  in  Figure 2, Aid from EU Member States and the EC accounts for half of 
total aid received by Tanzania in the three decades since  1966. EC aid has been about 
10% of total European aid to Tanzania, but sometimes as high as 25% during the period 
1992-96. 
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Figure 2 - Net Official Development Assistance to Tanzania 
(1966-96; 95 prices) 
--EC 
--EU 
-AU  Donora 
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Institutional Arrangements for Aid Management. 
The Tanzanian public administration has limited capacity to  implement efficiently the 
significant  volume  of  international  aid  it  receives,  particularly  given  donor 
fragmentation (sometimes competition). A recent study identifies up  to  2,000 separate 
projects from 40 different donors 
4
•  The monthly Joint Government-Donor Meeting is 
the key  local  co-ordination instrument.  In addition, there are also twenty Donor Co-
ordination working groups and sub-groups (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Sectoral Donor Coordination • Working Groups 
Macroeconomic Issues, SP A/JEM 
Budget 
BOP Support 
Environmental and Natural Resources 
Food and Agriculture 
Forestry 
Education 
Private Sector Development and Parastatal Reform 
Employment and Income Generation 
Governance 
Ci vii Service Reform 
Democratisation 
Infrastructure 
Roads 
Railways 
Power 
Gender and Development 
Population, Health and Nutrition 
Humanitarian Issues  and Development 
Participatory Development 
World Bank 
World Bank 
World Bank 
Netherlands 
FAOIWFP 
GTZ 
European Commission 
US AID 
UNDP 
Swiss Development Corporation 
European Commission 
Finland 
Rotating 
USAIDIWHO 
UNDP 
Finland 
A recent report on development co-operation
5 concluded that "the problems with regard 
to  aid effectiveness and co-ordination in Tanzania remain,  at their roots,  the result of 
failure to  match  individual donor and government agencies'  interests with agreed and 
co-ordinated priorities." 
Co-ordination in  the  context of a weak public  administration is  particularly difficult. 
Member States noted that formal co-ordination is affected by the capacity limitation of 
donors, and by  the  difference in  their institutional set-ups.  The formal  co-ordination 
meetings are sometimes not well organised.  They may be chaired by donors who do not 
have the time to  handle their administration, and who are not necessarily the  leading 
sectoral  donor.  However,  informal  co-ordination,  especially  among  "like-minded" 
donors (for example, among Nordic countries) appears to be quite effective. 
4  Gerald  K.  Helleiner  et  al.,  Report of the Group of Independent Advisers on  Development Cooperation 
Issues between Tanzania and its Aid Donors, June 1995. 
5 Ibidem. 
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CHAPTER II.  EUROPEAN UNION ASSISTANCE 
·A.  Relative Size and Importance of EC Aid 
European  Union-Tanzania co-operation  began  in  1914.  Support under  the  f:arst- three 
Lome Conventions concentrated mainly on agriculture/rural development and transport. 
Under Lome IV,  structural adjustment became a major element in the aid programme. 
The EC and the Member States account now for half of all aid to the country. ·  Tanzania 
is the second largest recipient of programmable assistance from the EC. 
Th~ size  and  allocation of EC  aid  to  Tanzania under successive Lome conventions is 
shown in Table 4.  A few trends in EU assistance have emerged  ov~r the last 10 years: 
(1)  EC  aid  has  grown  substantially;  (2)  there  has  been  a  shift  from  project  aid  to 
programme  support  (SASP,  Stabex),  as  the  latter  grew  from  10%  to  40%  of total 
commitments between EDF6 and EDF7; and (3) within project aid, health and education 
have received more resources over time. However, transport remains the most important 
sector in  the  EU  assistance programme  to  Tanzania. Transport,  one of the  sectors  of 
concentration in this study, accounts for two-thirds of Tanzania's NIPs. 
Table 4  • Size and Allocation of EU Assistance to Tanzania
1 
Size(MECU)  154.4  190.9  234.6  431.9  N/A 
I• 
Of  which: 
•  NIP  )03.4  120.7  152.0  190.9  240.5 
•  Other  ' 
EDF  &  36.1  31.0  51.3  218.9  NIA. 
EIB 
•  Budget  14.9  39.2  31.3  22.1  N/A 
Sectoral  Focus  Economic  Economic  EConomic  .Economic  Economic 
of NIP  infrastructure  infrastructure  infrastructure  infrastructure  infrastructure 
Rural  Rural  Rural  Rural  Social sectors 
development  development  development  development 
Social sectors 
Source: DGVIll Annual  ~eport. 
1. The table includes national programmable and non-programmable resources and budget lines.  It excludes resources from 
the Regional Indicative Programme. 
B.  Institutional Arrangements for EC Aid 
TheACP 
The  counterpart  of the  EC  is  the  National  Authorising  Officer.  The  NAO  is  the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance.  He has appointed three Deputy NAOs 
(i.e. the Desk Officel; the Deputy Permanent Secretary, Financial Resources.  and Policy 
of MOF;  and  the  Secretary for Treasury ·services).  The  work of the  NAO  is  mostly 
carried out by the Desk Officer with the support of an external Programme Support Unit 
staffed by local and foreign consultants. 
6 The desk officer reports to the Commissioner for External Finance. 
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The EDF Programme Support Unit (PSU)  to  the National Authorising Officer (NAO) 
started operations in  1994 with a staff of 20 and funding from an EDF project.  The PSU 
has worked mostly with foreign and local consultants and in common with other donor 
funded projects it has  paid supplementary payments to  some civil servants.  The PSU 
has also more recently received financing from SASP counterpart funds. The objectives 
of the PSU are to: 
•  facilitate close co-operation between the NAO and the Delegation; and 
•  support  the  administration  and  implementation  of EDF  funded  interventions  in 
Tanzania. 
The PSU has had a weak ad hoc administrative set-up
7
•  Consequently at times the co-
ordination  between  the  PSU  and  departments  in  the  Ministry  of Finance  has  been 
insufficient.  More  importantly,  the  PSU  has  had  difficulties  in  carrying  out  its 
functions  adequately.  Recent  reviews  have  found  weak  accounting  and  fmancial 
controls  in  the  PSU,  particularly  in  the  management  of  counterpart  funds.  The 
Delegation still carries out much of the  work that should have been done by the PSU 
(preparation of payment orders).  The operations of the PSU are in the process of being 
reviewed.  It is  expected that  this  will  result in  the  introduction of improved  working 
practices and some staff changes. 
The EC Delegation 
The EC Delegation in Tanzania has nine expatriate officials (i.e. the Head of Delegation, 
two  economic  advisers,  two  technical  advisers/engineers,  an  agriculture  adviser,  an 
administrative attache, the Head of Delegation's Secretary - who performs some of the 
roles of a financial officer  - and a Junior Programme Officer).  The local staff is made 
up of seventeen support staff (e.g. accountants, secretaries, drivers, messengers, etc.). In 
addition  to  NIP  projects,  the  Delegation  staff has  to  supervise  several  Stabex  sub-
projects,  12  separate regional co-operation activities, and  30 operations funded  under 
budget lines. 
Most of the advisers do not have terms of reference for their assignment and their roles 
and responsibilities are mostly defined by their predecessors' workload. Training before 
field assignment to a Delegation is limited.  In general, "for certain aspects, in particular 
social aspects, Women in Development, population, environment and sectoral or cross-
cutting issues, the EC lacks depth and expertise.  The same applies to the economic and 
analytical  work  needed  for  coherence  and  co-ordination.  Consequently,  the  staffmg 
situation for development co-operation in the EC remains questionable." 
8 
Table  5  provides  an  assessment  (indicative)  of the  relative  staffmg  levels  in  the 
representations of selected donors in Tanzania.  Although the disbursement ratio for the 
EC is broadly similar to these donors, the need to supervise 12 regional co-operational 
activities and 30 operations funded by budget lines suggests that the Delegation may be 
understaffed. This applies particularly in the monitoring of the reform programme and 
the social sectors.  However, the Delegation noted that these weaknesses were beginning 
to be addressed. 
However,  a more critical issue is how these  limited staff resources are utilised.  It  is 
difficult to assess the adequate staffmg requirements of the Delegation because its staff 
7  The  PSU  never  implemented  the  recommendations  of the  1994  review,  Coopers  &  Lybrand.  1994. 
Implementation Proposal for the EDF Programme Suppon Unit. 
8 DAC, Development Cooperation Review Series:  European Community, No.  12, Paris, 1996. 
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are  currently  over-burdened  by  complex  administrative  tasks. while  decision  making 
rema.ips  highly  centralised  compared  to  other  donors.  Delegation·  staff  regard 
insufficient delegation of operational budgets as an important  constraint on their work. 
Table S  • Disbursement-to-StatT Ratios for EC and Selected Bilateral Donors 
Operating in Tanzania 
11 
Disbursement in MECU 
No of  Higher Level (HL) Staff' 
Disbursement per HL Staff 
33 
7 
4,7 
54 
13 
4,2 
56 
17 
3,3 
Source:  For 1996 disbursements for each donor, OECD DAC on-line database. 
We have used this source to ensure consistency.  Other data from Interviews. 
62 
20 
3,1 
1/  In the case of regional offices, totaJ number of staff times the share of Tanzania on total regional disbursements. 
21  In the case of the EC, this figure Includes one Young Expert. 
Me~er  States: Co-ordination, Complementarity and Coherence
9 
.9 
3 
3,1 
Donor co-ordination is  always  difficult in  a country with the problems that Tanzania · 
faces  - a  very  weak  public. administration,  with  a' long  history  of macro-economic 
instability and foreign aid dePendency, insufficient ownership of the reform programme 
and weak sectoral  poli~ies.  In Tanzania, these factors  are .compounded by the large 
number of donors and the fragmentation of donors' projects and technical assistance
10
• 
Donor co-ordinatio~ varies from sector to sector. In many cases, communication among 
in-country donors is  difficult, and there are cases of intense donor competition.  The 
twelve Member States that have diplomatic missions in Tanzania hold monthly Heads of 
Missions meetings, quarterly Economic Advisers meetings and quarterly Development 
Counsellors  meetings.  Most  meetings  are  aimed  at  information  sharing;  joint 
operations (appraisal and evaluation) remain  more elusive.  This is  due  partly to  the 
different development approaches among Member States (and ,other donors), and partly 
to  their  institutional  set-ups,  which  differ  in  terms  of  both  staffmg  and  the 
decentralisation of decision-making. 
In many  cases  the  problem of external  co-ordination  is  compounded  by  insufficient 
internal co-ordination.  between donors in-country and their headquarters representations . 
. In  many  cases,  Member  States  mentioned  that  they  fmd  communication_  with  their 
headquarte~ difficult  and  often  the  view .  in  the  field  is  very .  different  from  that  in 
headquarters (for example, views on the educ(\tion sector development programme). 
In the present context it is difficult to ensure that policy recommendations or projects are 
complementary.  While.  some donors are particularly hopeful about the potential benefits 
9 Art.  130x of the Maastricht Treaty states that "the Community and the Member States shall co-ordinate 
their policies on development cooperation and shall consult ,each other on their aid programmes, irieluding 
international  organisations  and  during  international  conferences."  Other  important  principles  are 
coherence (Art. 130v of the Treaty) and complementarity. 
10 In fact,  the operation of donor agencies·  in the country significantly alters the local labour market.  See 
Labour Market Survey, February 1997. Consultancy report for the EC Delegation. 
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of the sector approach, others feel  that this is a long process that requires the gradual 
strengthening of Government's institutions.  They believe that the sector approach and 
co-ordination  are  difficult  when  the  Government  capacity  is  limited,  and  when  its 
ownership and commitment to the process is  in doubt (see discussion on the Transport 
sector).  SIDA,  however,  has  contributed to  aid  complementarity  by  pulling out from 
some sectors, based on its perceived relative strength and the work carried out by other 
donors. 
We asked Member States representatives to provide a subjective evaluation of the work 
of the EC Delegation in policy dialogue, aid co-ordination and aid implementation.  The 
results are presented in Figure 4.  While the data need to  be interpreted with caution, 
Member  States  representatives  found  EC  staff  responsive  and  appreciated  the 
Delegation's  efforts  towards  better  co-ordination  of  its  projects  and  policy 
recommendations with those of Member States.  However, most interviewees appear to 
be less satisfied with their involvement in the National Indicative Programming exercise 
and  operational  co-ordination.  Member  States  also  support  joint  appraisals  and 
evaluations strongly. 
In  consultations  with  donors,  Member  States  were  particularly  appreciative  of the 
technical expertise of the Delegation in  the  transport sector.  In  some cases, Member 
States were somewhat critical of the sectoral work of the World Bank.  They believed 
that  missions  from  headquarters,  although  technically  very  competent,  often  do  not 
co-ordinate  sufficiently  with  the  sectoral  work  of other  donors  (e.g.  transport  and 
education sector conditionality in the structural adjustment credit).  In  their view,  the 
World Bank also often insists on action plans and conditionalities that are not feasible 
given the weaknesses of the Government's public administration. 
Figure 4 
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CHAPTER m.  POLICY DIALOGUE 
A.  Indicative Programming 
Key Features 
The last two National Indicative Programmes were signed in October 1990 and March 
1997 respectively. The priority sectors in the NIP EDF7 were transport and agriculture, 
with a secondary priority given to the social sectors (particularly water supply).  In the 
most  recent  NIP,  agriculture  was  replaced as  a  priority sector by the  social  sectors 
(urban water supply and education). 
The  introduction  of the  Strategy Paper (March  1996)  strengthened aid  programming 
analysis, particularly by including sectoral evaluation lessons. However, this document 
still  underestimates  the  risks  under the  aid  programme  and  is  overly  optimistic  on 
Governance  issues  and  the  institutional  achievements  of both  the  Integrated  Roads 
Programme and the  SASP.  The Strategy Paper mentions that the "choice of second 
focal sector is less clear cut", in fact, the choice of education as part of the second focal 
sector was not backed by sufficient sectoral expertise and staffmg in the field. 
The Delegation took a strong lead in the preparation of the Strategy Paper and the NlP. 
The Strategy Paper was subject to extensive consultations within the EC.  The frrst draft 
of the Strategy Paper was prepared in May 1995 and it was finalised a year later.  In 
May 1996, it was discussed by the EDF Committee and some Member States noted the 
need to include in the NIP poverty, environment, gender and regional issues. Member 
States  also  emphasised  the  importance  of co-ordinated  assistance  (including  joint 
operation)  in  capacity  building.  Finally,  some  Member  States  referred  to  potential 
difficulties in the EC'  s involvement in the education sector. 
The Strategy Paper was a key input to the NIP programming.  Initial discussions on the 
NIP began in mid-1996. However, they were delayed because of personnel changes in 
the Delegation.  The Government initially favoured more focal sectors. The NIP was 
discussed  in  6  sectoral  working groups,  constituted by 4-5  members  each  (including 
NAO, hnplementing Agency, Technical Assistance and the Delegation).  Discussions 
were organised in workshopsll.  In November 1996, the NIP was discussed in a large 
workshop
12 and was then sent to Headquarters for final comments.  The Comite de Suivi 
favourably reviewed the NIP. 
The Delegation found the Strategy Paper and the NIP useful exercises.  The process 
involved both Delegation  staff and T A.  Donor consultations in-country  varied from 
sector to  sector.  Sectoral co-ordination was  generally better in the sectors  where the 
Delegation had more expertise.  The addition  of the  education sector as  part of the 
second focal sector was justified by the deterioration in education indicators.  However, 
the Delegation realised that it had limited staffmg and expertise in this sector. 
The Government appreciated its increased participation in the NIP exercise. However, in 
Tanzania,  given  the  weakness  of  institutional  structures,  the  ownership  of  the 
programming process is always difficult.  This is particularly problematic when project 
11  As with most other donors in Tanzania,  workshops normally require payments to civil servants. 
12 In a note of November 1996, Headquarters insisted that the NIP should make reference to  the Education 
Sector  Development  Programme.  A  month  later,  Headquarters  recommended  to  increase  the  forecast 
disbursements for the education sector. 
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structures (including the PSU) are not fully integrated into Government structures. The 
private sector was well represented in the Coffee sector working group. 
Member States'  participation in  the  Strategy Paper and  the NIP exercise varied  from 
sector to  sector. In some sectors, participation appears  to  have  been limited. Member 
States noted the importance of encouraging joint programming and appraisal operations. 
B.  Structural Adjustment 
Key Features 
Tanzania has  been under BWI supported structural  adjustment programmes for  more 
than 10 years  .. The. policy- dialogue. on macroeconomic-stabilisation, market and public 
sector reforms has been led by the BWI.  During most of this period monetary and fiscal 
IMF  benchmarks  have  been  missed.  At  the  same  time,  the  B  WI  have  gradually 
introduced  more  conditionalities  in  order  to  micro-manage  change  in  Government 
institutions.  However, this has not proved very successful.  The Government has always 
found ways to continue to finance activities which it believed essential (e.g. parastatals). 
Several Policy Framework Papers have been produced over the last 10 years, they have 
been  over-ambitious  and  their  targets  have  frequently  been  missed.  The  ESAF 
programme was last declared "off-track" in November 1993, and was replaced by a Staff 
monitored  programme  in  June  1996.  The  current  ESAF  arrangement  was  signed  in 
November 1996, and continues to be on-track. 
In  the  last  10  years,  reform has  been  most successful (albeit slow) in  liberalising the 
foreign  exchange  and  agricultural  markets.  In  contrast,  fmancial  reform has  proved 
particularly difficult.  Reform in other sectors has also been hampered by the weakness 
of institutional capacity and political  will  on  the part of the Government, and  by  the 
weak and uncoordinated donor support to  the Civil Service Reform Programme
13
•  The 
Government's policy dialogue has also been affected by this institutional weakness and 
by  the Government's dependence on  external  ~d.  The micro-management introduced 
by  the BWI partly explains why the Government often agrees to conditionalities that it 
knows it  will not be able to  implement.  In other cases, civil servants are contracted by 
donors  to  be  consultants  in  sectoral  work
14
•  All  these  factors  may  compromise 
Government ownership of the reform programme may be compromised. 
The  dialogue  on  macroeconomic  stabilisation  and  structural  reform has  been  almost 
exclusively carried out by  the BWI.  During the last few  years, the Delegation has  had 
limited  capacity  to  monitor  economic  developments  and  has  not  been  significantly 
in"olved  in  policy dialogue  in  the  general  reform process.  In  the past, co-ordination 
with  the  World Bank appears to  have been  limited and the  EC  did not participate in 
Public Expenditure Reviews. 
Since July 1992, the EC has provided Tanzania with three SASPs, totalling 120 million 
ECU
1s.  The SASPs are intended to support the overall reform programme as well as the 
accessibility  and  quality  of health  and  education  services.
16  This is  to  be  achieved 
through  counterpart fund  support to  the  Government budget and  through the  support 
13  Tanzania's civil service belongs to "low wage" classification, IMF Working Paper 179, 1997, Decade of 
Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
14 They can also receive overtime payments or sitting allowances or trips abroad.  This was already noted in 
the 1989 Public Expenditure Review. World Bank. 
15  SASP 1 for 30 Mecu, SASP 2 for 55 Mecu and SASP 3 for 35 Mecu. 
16  However, the most recent SASPs have not been targeted at the health sector, given the presence of other 
donors in this sector. 
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given  to  sectoral  budgetary  improvements.  The  SASPs  were  to  provide  counterpart 
funds  to  the  non-wage recurrent budget of the health and education sector and SASP 
conditionality was  linked  to  both the  ESAF and the social  sectors.  However,  during 
implementation this budgetary approach proved difficult to follow. 
Technical  Assistance  was  allocated  to  support  improvements  in  the  social  sector 
budgets.  However, their achievements were extremely limited because of the weakness 
of the Government's fiscal stance and its public administration capabilities, and because 
of  staffing  constraints  on  the  Delegation's  monitoring  and  donor  co-ordination 
capacities.  In  practice,  the  TA programme  was  not  well  integrated  with  Government 
structures 
17
. 
The SASP represented almost 40% of EC' s total commitments to Tanzania under EDF 6 
and EDF 7. It is the largest EDF financed operation.  However, insufficient manpower in 
the  Delegation  and  support  from  Headquarters  did  not  facilitate  effective  economic 
monitoring or an  active policy dialogue with the  Government on reforms on the social 
sectors (including budgeting). 
The Delegation notes that its work is constrained by the administrative workload. SASP 
policy  decisions  are  taken  by  Headquarters  and  this,  in  the  past,  has  created  some 
frictions. In some cases, the Delegation has argued for the disbursement of SASP funds 
even  when  the  reform programme was  off-track. The Delegation,  with  the  NAO,  had 
more control on the use of SASP counterpart funds. 
Government  officials  believe  that  the  BWI have  the  upper hand  in  economic  reform 
negotiations.  In  this  context,  the  Government  has  often  accepted  unrealistic  or 
contradictory conditionalities. They  value  their close relationship  with  the  Delegation 
and  its  support  in  the  use  of counterpart funds,  although  some  officials  believe  that 
SASP funds  are  linked  to  too  many  conditions and  are often  an  unreliable  source of 
funds. 
In our consultations, the  BWI and Member States noted that the Delegation seemed to 
have staffing constraints which affect the monitoring of economic developments and its 
policy dialogue in  social sector reforms  (including budgeting).  These constraints also 
affected in-~ountry donor co-ordination. 
At the same time, most Member States were concerned by the "high flying" approach of 
the BWI.  In their view, BWI are quick to identify solutions but have more difficulties in 
establishing  priorities  and  realistic  action  plans.  Their  relatively  small  in-country 
presence makes  it more  difficult for them to understand the  institutional  weakness in 
Tanzania and  to  monitor donors'  sectoral  dialogue  with  the  Government.  This  can 
sometimes  lead  to  BWI  interventions  which  can  have  negative  impact  on  donors' 
sectoral programmes.  For example, in the context of the ESAF review in mid 1996, the 
Government  decided  to  use  the  Road  Fund  to  support  the  general  budget  (see  next 
section).  Similarly,  a  number  of other  donors  noted  that  the  recent  World  Bank 
Structural Adjustment Credit included a number of conditionalities in the social sectors 
without sufficient consultation with the key donors in the sector. 
17 This refers to the Budget Improvement Support Programme and not to the small but important TA support 
for the introduction of VAT. 
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Evaluation 
The process of structural adjustment in a country like Tanzania is particularly difficult. 
The SASP has supported the overall reform programme.  However, the achievement of 
its  specific  objectives  have  been  affected  by  the  difficulties  in  the  overall  reform 
programme and in particular by the weakness of the Civil Service Reform Programme. 
Staffmg  constraints  in  the  Delegation  and  the  underestimation  of  the  difficulties 
involved in  managing the  SASP have  led  to  limited policy dialogue on  social  sector 
budgetary reforms,  limited donor co-ordination and  insufficient monitoring of reform 
developments. 
C.  Policy Dialogue in the Transport Sector 
Key Features 
The  main  features  of  donor  assistance  to  the  transport  sector  m  Tanzania  are 
summarised in Box 1. 
In  the  1960s the road network was quite adequate and relatively well managed, but it 
seriously deteriorated during the  1970s and  1980s.  Funds allocated for  maintenance 
declined from US$800 per km in  1968 to US$400 in  1988.  In addition to low levels of 
funding, the deterioration of roads was caused by fragmented and weak management of 
the network.  With the Economic Recovery Programme in  1986, the rehabilitation of the 
country's roads  became a  priority again.  Preparation for  the Integrated Roads Project 
(IRP)  started in  mid  1987  with a study to determine what actions would be  needed to 
improve  conditions  of rural  roads.  The  Government  then  held  a  Transport  Sector 
Donors' Conference in December 1987 to present a draft National Transport Policy.  A 
series of studies were carried out between December 1987 and December 1989 when the 
Government  presented  the  Integrated  Roads  Project  at  the  Paris  Consultative Group 
meeting.  IRP was  launched in  March  1991.  Since  1991, the Coordination Office for 
Donor Assisted Projects (CODAP) has been in charge of donor coordination.  Monthly 
and  quarterly  reports are distributed  to  all  donors  involved in  the  project and donors 
meet twice a year in a conference chaired by the Permanent Secretary. 
During the preparation of IRP, co-ordination was relatively straightforward as  it meant 
sub-dividing construction among various donors.  Since the early 1970s donors had been 
operating in  particular districts.  The multilateral agencies essentially filled  in  the gaps 
in  the  network.  The  EC  felt  at  the  time  that  its  comparative  advantage  was  in 
construction and not institutional capacity building, an  area where the World Bank was 
instead starting to operate in several African countries.  Similarly, the Delegation did not 
have enough field staff or technical back-up from Headquarters to play a key role in the 
policy dialogue in the transport sector. Until  1996, leadership in the key areas of policy 
dialogue  and  institutional  strengthening  was  therefore  provided  by  the  World  Bank 
whose IRP Task Manager became the Bank's Resident Representative in Dar es Salaam 
during the first half of the  1990s.  The EC had a very limited role in both areas.  Under 
IRP, the World Bank provided one quarter of the funding for construction but more than 
three  quarters  of the  financing  for  institutional  strengthening,  while  the EC provided 
28%  and  6%  of the  fmancing  in  these  areas.  (For  a  discussion  on  institutional 
arrangements in the transport sector see Box 4 in the next Chapter). 
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Box 1 - Donor Assistance to the Transport Sector in  Tanzania. An Overview. 
Tanzania has a surface area equivalent to  Spain and France combined.  More than 80% of the 
almost 30 million population live in rural areas with concentrations on the geographical periphery. 
Given the dispersed nature of  economic activities, the transport sector plays a very important role. 
Besides  integrating  domestic  markets~ the  transport  system provides  an  outlet  to  the sea for 
Malawi,  Zambi~ Burundi,  Rwan~  Zaire, and Uganda.  Roads are the main mode of transport, 
accounting for 60% of the global road and rail freight haulage.  The road network consists of 
about 3,800 km of paved trunk roads,  6~00  km of unpaved ·trunk roadsJ 20,000 km of regional 
roads, 24,000 km of district roads and 30,000 km of feeder and unclassified roads. There are two 
railway systems, Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) serVing 'the north (2.640km) and Tanzania-
Zambia Railway (TAZARA) in  the south (970 km).  There are 3 ocean ports (the largest being 
DarEs Salaam) as well as ports in 7Jmzibar. 
A. Integrated Roads Project 
Its activities and impact are summarised below. 
IRP Component  Objective  Input  Impact 
Upgrading  and  1,526km  lt454km 
rehabilitation  of  17 road sections  11  sections 
paved roads  ..,  US$  616  million 
Rehabilitation  of  2,546km  for rehabilitation  c  1,129 km 
gravel trunk roads  12 roads  ..,  US$  93  million  6roads 
Rehabilitation  of  3,000 Jan  for maintenance:  3.605 km 
ruraJgravelroads 
Rehabilitation  of  30bridges  1  bridge 
Trunk Road Bridges  10 ferry cross  in~  (construction) 
Institutional  Well functioning  organisation  ¥"  320 man  years of Very low 
Strengthening  to  manage  &  administer  the  TA. 
road network  ,f  usst04 Inillion· · , · 
Due to lack of maintenance and extraordinarily heavy rainst conditions of Tanzanian roads have·. 
started to  deteriorate again.  a reminder of the "build-collapse-build" circle of the  1970s and 
1980s.  Several bridges have collapsed and the road network is interrupted in several points~ The 
cost of bringing the road network to a maintainable good condition again has been estimated at 
US$240 million over a three-year period, equivalent to ·a third of the entire physical investment 
under IRP-I. 
B. Railways Restmcturing Project 
At the beginning of the  1990s~ the Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) was performing poorly 
due to an old track and a relatively elderly and problem-prone set of locomotives. of nine types. 
Since  1992,  the Railways Restructuring Project (RRP), co-funded by the World Bank, CIDA. 
KfW,  DFID  and  the  EC,  has  been  assisting  TRC in  upgrading  a _small  part  of the  track. 
rehabilitating locomotives, wagons and coaches and in strengthening TRC itself.  · 
The outcome has not been satisfactory.  A recent joint supervision mission concluded that  '~ 
has  not  achieved  its  (perhaps  optimistic)  objectives  of  assisting  the  Tanzania  Railways 
Corporation (fRC) to make the radical shift in its culture and level of  performance.  1f railways in 
Tanzania are to play their crucial role in economic developmen4 it is clear than a very different 
approach  is  needed.  Under  this  circumstances,  it would  not be  possible  for the  mission  to 
recommend  to their management a  continuation of assistance as envisaged  under RRP  .n  The 
different approach mentioned above is privatisation of  TRC, which is being  •. 
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The  IRP  programme  was  designed  taking  into  account  the  needs  of neighbouring 
countries (e.g.  Central Corridor).  The regional dimension was however limited to the 
design stage in deciding which roads to rehabilitate.  During the construction stage, EC 
regional  roads  projects  were  regional  in  funding  but the  implementation  was  kept at 
national level.  The Road Maintenance Initiative, sponsored jointly by the EC and the 
World  Bank,  held  several  regional  seminars  but  the  commitments  made  there  by 
Governments were infrequently followed by actions. 
Until  1993  donor views  on  IRP were  generally  positive.  Even  the March  1996,  EC 
Strategy Paper was quite positive on the progress of the IRP:  "Institutional reforms and 
the  strengthening  of key  organisations  such  as  the  Ministry  of W  arks,  which  has 
benefited from funding for training and substantial Technical Assistance (TA) from the 
Community and other donors,  has  been an  important factor in the improving of sector 
performance". These positive assessments were partially explained by the fact that road 
construction and rehabilitation was completed only at the end of 1995 and this stage is 
usually  the  more  straightforward  in  road  projects.  However,  the  risks  relating  to 
maintenance and  the  capacity of MOW had  been  raised by  the  EC and other donors 
since the early 1990s. 
There  is  now  general  agreement  that  governments  should avoid  increasing the  asset 
value  of the  road  network  without  generating the  additional  revenues  to  maintain  it. 
When  IRP  was  designed,  roads  were  in  a condition that  required rehabilitation more 
than maintenance.  However, as rehabilitation of roads was being completed, the focus 
shifted  towards  maintenance  where  Tanzania  had  very  limited  cap~city,  both  in 
manpower and financial tenns.  During the preparation of IRP, there was little analysis 
of the standard and type of road network that Tanzania could afford to maintain. Using 
the World Bank's User Charge model, a recent Government paper estimated that  the 
network  is  now  worth  US$  3  billion  and  requires  about  US$  90  million  a  year  in 
maintenance.  The cost of no maintenance is estimated at US$1 million a day. 
In this context, the key policy issue quickly became to ensure that Government kept its 
commitment to adequately maintain the road network that IRP donors had contributed to 
rehabilitate, as in the case of IRP-I: 
Hone precondition for achieving the anticipated return on investments is 
that  maintenance  is  carried  out  as  prescribed.  IF that  is  done  it 
appears that the  investments in  trunk  roads  rehabilitated under IRP, 
both paved and gravel, can yield the envisagtd return. "
18 
A crisis between donors and the Government arose in  mid  1996 when the Government 
Budget for FY96/97 showed no allocations to the Road Fund 
19
•  This was done in order 
to  facilitate  agreement  with  IMF  conditionalities.  Moreover,  during  the  frrst  four 
months of FY97,  only  12.5%  of the amount agreed under IRP was  transferred to  the 
18 Carl Bro International, Comprehensive Review of  IRP,  Draft Final Report, August 1997. 
19  The Road Fund was created in August  1991  through a Parliamentary Resolution.  The fund  was set up 
according  to  clause  17(1)  of  the  'Exchequer  and  Audit  Ordinance'  (Cap.  439)  which  permits  the 
Government  to  open special  funds.  The objective of the  Road  Fund is  to  meet maintenance costs  for 
Regional core roads.  It is funded through a fuel levy .  The FY97 Budget showed an allocation of nil to the 
Road Fund under MOW (Supply Vote 47, Sub-vote 345, Item 3919) and no  provision for allocation under 
the Prime Minister's Office/Local Government (Supply Vote  37).  The allocation  for  the Road  Fund  was 
instead part of the Contingencies of the Ministry of Finance Budget Division (Vote 50, Sub-vote 390, Item 
4804).  Only Tsh  1 billion was  released during the first  four  months of FY97 while Tsh.  15  billion were 
released in the following eight months after  tl:~ joint letter from IRP donors.  The FY98 Budget included an 
allocation ofTsh. 20 billion for the Road Fund (Vote 47; Programme 60, item 3200). 
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Ministry of Works (MOW).  The EC Delegation co-ordinated a strong letter from all the 
major donors (except the World Bank) requesting Government to resume releasing funds 
to  the Ministry, and succeeded in  its efforts, as  annual disbursements by the end of the 
fiscal year reached 96% of the IRP indicative amount.  However, at that point donors 
were not aware that up to a third of the Road Fund's allocations to the MOW had been 
improperly used during the previous three fiscal years, as revealed by the Road Fund's 
audits made available only in early 1998 
20
• 
The mid-1996 crisis was a warning signal for donors.  In this context, EC Headquarters 
began to question the monitoring system used under IRP. 
"The report from CODAP gives information on the execution of  donor funded activities 
but no real information on what is being carried out by the MOW on maintenance, what 
institutional reforms are under way,  what are their scheduled dates,  what is the impact 
of  the axle load controls, what are the expected and real revenues from the Road Fund." 
During the following year, the EC began to  reconsider its overall assistance strategy in 
the roads sector.  By mid 1997, the EC reached the conclusion that the highest economic 
returns  in  the  sector  would  come  from  institutional  strengthening  and  maintenance 
projects.  By  the end of the year it decided to  reallocate ECU  100 million from road 
upgrading programmes to backlog maintenance of priority roads.  This strategic shift is 
opposed by Government officials who have insufficient interest in institutional reform
21 
and are under political pressure to build and to rehabilitate roads. 
Like the EC, other donors also shifted their policies in the sector.  Donors shifted their 
focus  from  making  sure  that  resources  were  available  to  the  Roads  Fund  to 
understanding how these funds  were being used. 
22  Ambassadors and representatives of 
all major IRP donors sent a letter to  the Government stating that "reporting has tended 
to avoid critical policy issues, and donor co-ordination has been ineffectual."  The letter 
also  pointed  out  that  the  reform  of  the  institutional  arrangements  for  programme 
execution  should  receive  priority  attention  and  that  the  maintenance  situation  was 
"untenable".  "The IRP is at a crossroads.  With agreement on the fundamentals, we will 
have  a  basis for  restructuring  IRP-l/,  agreeing  on  priorities for the  next phase  of 
rehabilitation,  securing  adequate  resources  for  maintenance,  and  generally  re-
establishing the program on a sound footing.  Without it, few among us will be able to 
justify the continued allocation of  large amounts of  resources to the program." 
The  Del~gation was  aware  of  the  current  difficulties  in  policy  dialogue  with  the 
Government and the responsibilities associated with leading the policy dialogue in this 
area.  In  particular,  relations  with  the  Ministry  of Works  had  been difficult at  times 
during the last year, as the Delegation has often criticised its  poor performance. 
20 . The  audit for  FY94 and FY95  revealed  that out of Tsh.  16  billion remitted from  the Treasury to  the 
Ministry of Works Tsh 1. 7 billion had been used for purposes that had nothing to do with road construction 
or maintenance,  Tsh. 1.4 billion had no supporting documentation and Tsh. 2.6 billion had been used to pay 
a  revision  on  ten  major  contracts.  The  audit  for  FY96  found  excess  expenditure  for  Tsh ..  1.8  billion, 
unvouched expenditures for  1.6  billion and a loan to  the development account for Tsh.  1.3  billion.  Both 
audits " failed to ascertain the correctness of financial statements due to significant variances noted between 
the  financial  statements  and  the  books  of accounts"  and  concluded that  the  financial  statements "do  not 
rresent fairly the position of the Road Fund." 
1 In some cases,  some officials can benefit from the institutional weakness of a ministry like MOW which 
administers substantial amounts of money, while others are concerned that  institutional reform might mean 
retrenchment. 
22 DANIDA played an important role in the change of policy direction. 
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Government officials noted their disagreement with  the EC decision to reallocate NIP 
resources  from  road  upgrading  to  maintenance  and  institutional  strengthening. 
However,  the  Government  is  very  appreciative  of the  quality  of dialogue  with  the 
Delegation. 
Member States welcome the leadership in policy dialogue exercised by the Delegation in 
the last year and they acknowledged the  significant expertise of the Delegation in  the 
transport sector.  Some Member States were concerned about frictions between the EC 
and the World Bank and were somewhat critical of the World Bank's co-ordination with 
other key donors in the sector.  They were also concerned of the role of the BWI in the 
mid-1996 crisis over the Road Fund. 
Evaluation 
Several lessons have emerged from the experience of the Integrated Roads Project.  IRP 
was designed before the debate on sector wide approaches started and it did not benefit 
from  the  lessons  emerging from  this  debate.  Table 6  below  reviews  IRP using  the 
principles and preconditions identified by Harrold
23 and later refined in the SPA meeting 
in  December  1996.  The  IRP  had  important  strengths  like  the  strong  Government 
ownership of the  programme and  a clear sector strategy.  Preparation was  also  very 
participatory  by  the  standards  of the  late  1980s,  although  road  users  had  been  only 
marginally involved.  However, IRP was deficient in four areas: 
1.  the Ministry of Works did not have the capacity to manage such a large programme 
(in the words of an aid official, it was "choked" by donors); 
2.  T  A was poorly co-ordinated and often poorly managed.  The sheer size of T  A (i.e. 
320 man years) overwhelmed the Tanzanian counterparts; 
3.  roads,  railways  and  ports  were dealt  with  separately  (and  railways  suffered from 
many of the same problems); and 
4.  implementation  arrangements  were  different  for  each  of  the  17  aid  agencies 
supporting IRP. 
23  Harrold,  P.  et  al.,  The  Broad Sector Approach to  Investment Lending,  World  Bank Discussion Paper 
Number 302, 1995. 
IDC - August 1998  26 Chapter ill  Policy Dialogue 
Table 6 - IRP as a Sector-Wide Approach 
Was the IRP a Sector·  wide Approach?  Yes  Somewhat  No 
A. Preconditions 
1.  Government leadership  ~ 
2.  Technical capacity  ~ 
3.  Adequate standards of financial management  ~ 
4.  Clear sector strategy  "' 
B. Basic Principles 
1.  Sector-wide in scope  "'  2.  Coherent sector policy framework  "'  3.  Local stakeholders in the driver's seat  ~ 
4.  All donors sign on  "'  5.  Common implementation arrangements  ~ 
6.  Good design and management ofT  A  "' 
The first precondition for a  sector-wide approach was  missing as  the capacity of the 
Ministry of Works and  the Ministry of Communications and Transport was  minimal. 
The design  of IRP  was  flawed  in  assuming that  with  T  A  support  the  MOW would 
become  an  effective  implementing  agency.  In  sectors  such  as  agriculture,  sector 
institutional  assessments  and  sector  management  programmes  now  precede  sector 
investment programmes by a few years.  Similar lessons had been drawn from previous 
road projects  in  Tanzania
24  and are  being applied to  new transport sector investment 
programs  in  other countries (e.g.  in  the  Uganda road  sector, donors  have  decided  to 
support  a  pre-investment  project  designed  to  strengthen  institutional capacity  before 
launching into a sector investment programme). 
The  policy  framework  was  negatively  affected  by  the  uncertainties  on  the  fmal 
administrative  configuration  for  transport  policy  and  road  management  and  the 
institutional changes requested by donors under IRP-I were not made until very recently. 
These lessons have been internalised by donors and the current focus on maintenance 
and institutional strengthening is probably a move in the right direction. 
The major difficulty now is how to build capacity in the road sector.  As noted by the 
SPA Work Group 4, "it was one thing to lay out a vision of the final "ideal" institutional 
framework.  But the  immediate  problem is  what  is  the  minimum acceptable  level  of 
performance  in  the  various  institutional  areas  (e.g.  budget  management,  expenditure 
control, audit) that would give donors the confidence that chances of success are good. 
That level remains to be defined  ... " Donors have very few success stories in institutional 
strengthening in Africa. 
In  part as  a result of donor pressure, the President has set up an Inter-ministerial Task 
Force to oversee IRP and appointed a new PS  in  the Ministry of Works.  It is expected 
that a Road Agency will be established soon. 
24  See for example World Bank, VI Highway Rehabilitation Project- Implementation Completion Report, 
June 1995  p.  v.  "Undertake main institutional changes prior to project effectiveness.  The structure of  road 
administration has been subject to frequent changes under the implementation of  the project.  The result of 
these  clu..mges  was  confusion,  poorly  organised  planning  administration  end  ineffective  long-term 
institutional and work force development." 
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D.  Policy Dialogue in the Education Sector 
This  section  is  tentative  because  the  involvement  of the  EC  in  the  education  sector 
policy dialogue is too recent to be adequately studied.  It is important however, in view 
of the  EC  experience  with  the  transport  sector  approach 
25
•  Key  features  of the 
education sector in Tanzania are summarised in Box 2. 
Since 1993, the World Bank has supported the reform of the social sectors and a greater 
role  for  cost-sharing  (Social  Sector  Review,  1994  and  the  Human  Resource 
Development project). Initially, this created some frictions with other donors.  However, 
co-ordination between the World Bank and other donors appears to have improved as  a 
result of a meeting with Nordic donors (January 1996), the joint appraisal of the HRD 
project (March 1996) and a reduction in the scope of this project. 
Box 2-The Education Sector in Tanzania 
The education system in Tanzania ha.S been a major constraint on potential economic 
growth.  The proportion of  children going through the education System is small. and the 
quality  of teaching is  low.  While numbers  enrolled in the lowest years  of primary 
education are moderate, high dropout rates and a small secondary system mean that very 
few  children  reach  higher  levels.  In  many  cases,  teachers ..  ·have  insufficient 
qualifications.  There is a also severe shortage of  textbooks~  Iristitutional management 
of the  sector is fragmented
26  and  there. appears  to  be  .insuffi,ciellt~acoountabllity. The 
school inspectorate is understaffed, and  has failed  to. prevenf:schools' 'quatity  from 
declining.  ·  ··  · ·  -·  ::_; .  y·  ·.,  \  , 
'•  ; :-....  :·  '  -, ·:.:. --.:  ~ .: :,  ' 
In the  1990's,  the  Government  p~ced  .a numlYer:_of  ~majoi'.~n6y· d~Trlents21 • 
However,  sector refonns  are  difficult to  implement  given .. the  Sector* s.  institutional 
weakness, its fragmentation and the problems posed in cO..ordinating a large nlltllber of 
donors.  The major donors in the education sector are Denmark. Sweden arid  Norway~ 
Donor support has been historically biased against primary education, ·with secondary 
education  receiving  30%  of total  donor funds,  vocational training 21% ·and tertiary 
education 15%.28  ·  ·  ·  · 
The  EC  has  been  involved  in  the  education  sector  through  a  number  of dispersed 
interventions  in  human  resources  development,  and  through  SASP  activities
29
• 
However,  the  EC  realised  that,  given  the  difficulties  associated  with  a  project-based 
approach,  these aid  interventions could be  more effective in  the context of a sectoral 
approach.  Moreover, since April 1997 the EC has been formally responsible for the co-
ordination  of  donors  in  the  sector,  decision  by  the  Member  States'  Director 
Generals
30.All  this  process  eventually  led  to  the  "Institutional  Strengthening for  the 
25 The analysis of education policy dialogue under the SASP has been discussed in the previous section. 
26 Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education and the Prime 
Minister's Office are responsible for the management of the education sector. 
27  The Tanzanian Education System for  the 21st  Century (1993), The Integrated Education and Training 
Policy (1993), The Tanzanian Education and Training Policy (1995). 
28 Donor Assistance to the Education Sector in Tanzania, DANIDA, December 1994. 
29  The  nature  of the  Human  Resource  Development  Programme  interventions  does  not  allow  their 
description in this report.  However, this programme will be subject to an external evaluation and audit. 
30 The EC was selected for this role because DANIDA had decided to reduce its interventions in the sector. 
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Education Sectoral Development Programme", a  1.9 MECU project approved in June 
1997
31
• 
The EC initiated its  more active role in  the education sector in August  1996, when it 
decided  to  finance  the  creation  of  the  Education  Sector  Co-ordinating  Committee 
(ESCC) and its Secretariat.  This new structure is chaired by the Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Education and Culture and is aimed at improving the management of the 
sector.  The Secretariat supports the ESCC and is  staffed by local consultants.  Since 
then, the EC has provided financing
32 for the attendance of ESCC meetings and for the 
operational costs of its Secretariae
3
•  Initially, the EC intended to finance the ESCC only 
for  a  few  months.  However,  no other donor has  contributed to  the financing of the 
ESCC and Secretariat as yet. 
At  the  same  time,  DFID  had  been  working  separately  in  an  ambitious  institutional 
project for  the education  sector.  The project was  approved in  May  1997,  GBP  1.8 
Million
34
,  and  supported  the  creation  of six  additional  administrative  and  technical 
structures. Its Technical Assistance is co-ordinated by a managing agene
5
•  The use of 
Technical Assistance appears to be high. A recent report from this agent shows that in 
the last quarter of 1997
36
,  it had contracted 12 consultants and printed 133,585 report 
pages,  while  for  the  first  quarter  of  1998,  it  had  contracted  55  consultants  and 
researchers. 
The EC policy dialogue has focused on the support of a Sector Development Programme 
in the education sector.  This has contributed to the completion of the Basic Education 
Master Plan  and  its  adoption  by  the  ESCC  (February  1997).  However,  given  the 
institutional weakness and fragmentation of the education sector, the EC has pursued 
this  dialogue  while  fmancing  new  quasi-government  structures  and,  in  some cases, 
providing allowances to Government staff.  This is a practice common to other donors in 
the sector but perhaps more problematic in the context of a sector approach. 
The  EC  has  worked  hard  to  implement  the  sector  development  programme,  but 
manpower constraints in the Delegation have limited its capacity to closely monitor the 
impact  of complex  institutional  reforms  and  to  co-ordinate  its  activities  with  other 
donors.  However,  the  Delegation  staffing  for  the  education  sector  has  recently 
improved. 
In  March 1998, the appraisal of the Education Sector Development Programme (SDP) 
was postponed.  Donors jointly wrote to the Government that a "common understanding 
of the main elements and implications of the SDP and its linkages with other reforms 
(particularly in  the civil service) was still missing".  This joint position was effectively 
co-ordinated by the Delegation (February 1998
37
). 
31  Local experts  ECU  360,000;  short  term international experts ECU 540,000; capacity building/training 
ECU 200,000; Equipment ECU 500,000; Operational cost ECU 210,000 and Contingencies ECU 100,000. 
32 The EC contracts the Economic Social Research Foundation to provide support to this quasi-government 
unit and to implement the administrative arrangements.  (Information as of March 1998.) 
33  The introduction of additional structures (Sector Management Group, as  well as  the Technical Advisory 
Support Team), has expanded the structures financed by the EC. 
34 "Support to the Tanzania Education Sector Development Programme, Management and Design". 
35 The EC selected a different agent in August 1997. 
36 Excluding some DFID consultants supporting TAST. 
37  Letter to  Ministry of Education and  Culture  was  signed  by  11  ambassadors/representatives  (February, 
1998). 
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The Delegation  is  aware of the  difficulties  in  carrying out  policy dialogue  with  the 
Government  and  co-ordinating  donors  with  limited  staffing.  Missions  from 
Headquarters have been useful but not as frequent as needed.  In the last few months, a 
Delegation adviser has been more active in the education sector but this is  probably at 
the expense of other key activities. 
Government officials in the education sector are appreciative of the financial resources 
they have received from the EC to finance new  quasi-governme~t structures.  However, 
they believe that the SDP requires more flexible access to EC resources, more use of 
local consultants and increased "local compensation" for technical staff involved in the 
education SDP
38  (see Box below).  Education officials also believe that donors should 
contribute to  an Education Fund. However, some Treasury officials are more sceptical 
about the sustainability of these arrangements. 
Box 3 • Constraints on SDP Education Process according to Internal Review 
(December 1997) 
A. Lack of  an appropriate and effective level of incentives and rewards to technical teams; 
B. Stagnated budgetary support for SDP management and activities 
C.  Inability of  the managing agent to cope up with SDP work schedules caused inter alia by: 
•  constraints on budgetary flows for SOP activities; 
•  slowness in effecting payments; 
•  lack of clarity between Sector Management Team and Economic Social Research 
Foundation (ESRF).on the point of contact for defmingand drawing down EU local 
finance support for SDP activities; 
•  inefficient operating procedures between SMT, British Council/ HEDCO and ESRF,. 
resulting in an absence of  common systems and technical/framework reporting; 
•  lack of a Technical Assistance Account to receive donor SDP support funds to be 
operated by the Government and Managing agents. 
At the time of our visit, Member States and the World Bank noted that they were not 
fully aware of the nature of the EC support to the education SDP and that co-ordination 
among key  donors  in  the  SDP process  had been  weak.  However,  these  donors  also 
recognised that the Delegation has recently played a very effective role in co-ordinating 
donors and helping to  define common donor positions  (as  with joint letter,  February 
1998).  Most donors also noted that the new quasi-government administrative structures 
are  not  linked yet  to  the  Civil  Service Reform and  might  prove unsustainable.  They 
expressed some concern that the education sector might not have yet the management 
capacity to  deal  with a large number of consultancies, reports and fmancial resources. 
Some donors also noted that part of these activities are mainly driven by foreign TA
39
• 
Evaluation 
The EC  policy  dialogue  in  the  education  sector  has  contributed  to  the  Government 
formally adopting a sector developmebt programme
40
•  However, the experience in  the 
Transport sector shows the difficulty of implementing this approach in  the context of 
weak  Government  institutions.  As  in  the  road  sector,  the  first  steps  in  the  sector 
approach  appear  to  have  underestimated  the  sustainability  of  new  institutional 
38 See also the SDP Internal Review, December 1997. 
39 Significantly, consultants were not invited to the  recent SDP pre-appraisal (March 1998). 
40 DFID has also played a key role, with the support of Ireland. 
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arrangements, the difficulty of addressing the low pay of key Government staff and the 
manpower  demands  of  effective  donor  co-ordination.  More  recently,  donor  co-
ordination in the sector appears to be improving and there is increasing consensus on the 
need  to  co-ordinate  the  sector development  programme  with  the  wider  civil  service 
reform process. 
E.  Incorporation of Poverty, Governance, Environment and Gender 
Poverty, governance, environment and gender are key factors in the effectiveness of aid 
implementation.  For example, a recent study reports that "analysis of the determinants 
of project success shows that both government credibility and freedom from corruption 
are positively related to  project outcome."
41
•  Similarly,  "projects with gender-related 
actions achieved their overall objectives- that is, received a satisfactory outcome rating 
-in relatively greater proportion than projects similar in sector and year of approval but 
. h  d  .  ,42  '  wtt  out gen  er actwns. 
In  the context of Tanzania,  the  latest NIP explicitly recognises  the  importance of the 
poverty  criteria,  "The  overall  objective  pursued  through  co-operation  under  this 
Indicative Programme is  the promotion of sustainable economic growth with particular 
attention  to  improving  the  welfare  of  the  poorest  sections  of  society".  In  the 
implementation of these  aims,  several  programmes  have  tried  to  address  the  poverty 
objectives.  A key objective of the SASP was to protect the social sector expenditures. 
However, this  has  proven difficult to  achieve.  More successfully. Stabex counterpart 
funds have been used as compensation payments to coffee farmers.  Farmers spent these 
resources  mostly  on  food,  school  fees  and  coffee  inputs
43
•  This  programme  was 
designed to  support coffee farmers  directly and proved very efficient, although it was 
implemented outside the Government budget. 
On the issue of Governance and corruption, most donors understand its importance and 
it was  discussed in  the  latest Consultative Group  meeting in  December  1997  (Dar es . 
Salaam).  In our visit most donors recognised the significant and visible role played by 
the Delegation in  keeping this  important issues  in  the  agenda,  mostly  through  public 
speeches.  Donors recognise that this is a very important but delicate role.  In terms of 
the policy dialogue, the concept of Governance has been carried out by the Delegation's 
strong stance  (co-ordinated with  other donors)  on  the  misuse of Road Funds.  In the 
coffee sector, the EC has initiated an innovative policy dialogue with key stakeholders in 
the  sector.  It is  trying to  support the  policy dialogue between  the  private sector and 
Government, to  strengthen civil society.  In  operational terms,  Governance has  mainly 
been addressed through programme support to increased transparency and accountability 
in public administration.  The EC also provided a grant of about 2 MECU to support the 
1995 multi-party elections, as part of a larger donor program. 
The  design  of  recent  projects  has  benefited  from  the  availability  of  the  1993 
Environment Manual.  This manual is  particularly helpful in  determining the need for 
environmental impact assessments during project preparation. This is important because 
41  OED,  The  Annual Review of Development Effectiveness (ARDE),  November  1997,  The  World  Bank, 
Washington DC. 
42  OED,  Mainstreaming  Gender  in  World  Bank  Lending:  An  Update,  March  1997,  The  World  Bank, 
Washington DC. 
43  Tibaijuka, A.  Study on the Impact of  the  /990 Stabex Compensation Payment to  Coffee Farmers,  1994. 
University of Dares Salaam. 
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a  recent  environmental  evaluation
44  found  that,  in  the  past,  environmental  impact 
assessments had not been widely carried out in Tanzania.  This situation has improved in 
recent transport and water projects.  The EC has several important projects in the area of 
wildlife conservation and over 2% of its assistance under EDF 7 went to environmental 
protection.  The gender manual and the National Gender Training Workshop (January 
1998) appear to have been less effective in operational terms as yet. 
F.  Assessment of EC Policy Dialogue 
The extent of EC policy dialogue with  the Government in  the context of the overall 
reform programme has been limited.  However, the EC has begun to play an important 
role  in  the  transport policy dialogue.  On structural adjustment, the difficulties in  the 
BWI reform programme, an over-ambitious EC programme and insufficient Delegation 
staff  have  led  to  limited  monitoring  of  the  reform  programme  and  limited  policy 
dialogue on social sector' expenditures and budgeting. 
The main lesson at the sector level. both in transport as well as in education, has been 
the difficulty of implementing sector approaches (and donor-co-ordination) in a context 
where Government institutions are extremely weak.  A  key lesson in  transport is  that 
institutional strengthening and policy dialogue are difficult but unavoidable areas for EC 
involvement.  Having left the leadership in both areas to the World Bank, the EC was 
the largest donor on road rehabilitation but it did not have much influence on these key 
factors affecting the performance of its programmes.  The EC is  now a key player in 
both areas but it will need to devote significant resources to these tasks both in the field 
and  Headquarters.  In  the  education  sector,  it  would  appear  that  to  avoid  more 
fragmentation  of  Government  institutions  and  further  weakening  their  financial 
accountability, donors need to jointly support the reform of the Civil Service.  Systems 
by  which  individual  donors  determine  civil  servants'  remuneration  or  finance 
Government structures are probably not sustainable
45
• 
In  the  case  of  the  EC,  the  difficulties  in  carrying  out  policy  dialogue  with  the 
Government and in donor co-ordination are compounded by the fact that the Delegation 
staff have limited time for these activities. This is explained by the number of activities 
in which the EC is involved and by its over-complex administrative controls. 
Many of the  difficulties  in  carrying-out policy dialogue  are shared by  other donors. 
While the use of conditionality has made the BWI dialogue more prominent, the track 
record  of  many  reforms  shows  that  Government  ownership  might  have  been 
compromised.  Furthermore, some Member States believe that the BWI in some cases 
does not adequately co-ordinate with key sector donors.  In  this context, they support a 
more active role for the EC in sectoral policy dialogue. 
44  Environmental  Resources  Management,  Evaluation  of  the  Environmental  Performance  of  EC 
Programmes in Developing Countries, June 1997. 
45  The  problems  of introducing a sector approach  in  this context  also  appear to  be present in  the Local 
Government Reform programme. See DAC Guidelines for Effective Aid. 1992. 
IDC - August 1998  32 Shift  from 
projects to 
programmes 
started 
Chapter IV  Aid Implementation and Management 
CHAPTER IV.  AID 11\fPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT 
A.  The Instruments 
The  EC  has  provided  about  5%  of all  official  development  assistance  received  by 
Tanzania in  the last thirty years.  While' EC assistance was initially project related, the 
importance of non-programmable aid (SASP, Stabex) has increased steadily during the 
1990s and accounted for about half of all commitments under EDF 7 (see Table 7 ). 
Table 7  - EC Assistance to Tanzania under EDF 6, 7 and 8
11 
,., 
~  ~  ~-...  ~ ',  Sector 
ea 
Transport and Communications  178,9  57,2°/c  162,6  36,4°/c  120,0  50,0% 
Education/Capacity Building  0,6  0,2°/c  25,1  5,6°/c  25,0  10,4% 
Environment  0,0°/c  9,3  2,1 °/c  0,0°/c 
Agriculture 
21  62,8  20,10fc  6,9  1  ,5°/c  0,0% 
Structural Adjustment/Stabex  32,5  10,4°/c  177,7  39,8%  25,0  10,4% 
Trade!Tourism  10,0  3,2°/c  7,2  1  ,60fc  10,0  4,2°/c 
EIB Risk Capital and Interest Relief  26,4  8,50fc  52,2  11,70fc  0,0°/c 
Emergency/Refugees  0,1  O,OOfc  2,9  0,70fc  0,0°/c 
Other  1,5  0,5°/c  2,5  0,6o/c  15,0  6,3°/c 
Total  312,8  100,0°  446,5  100,0°  240,0  100,0° 
Programmable Regional  126,2  40,3°/c  70,1  15,70fc  nla 
Non-programmable  23,4  7,50fc  217,8  48,8°/c  nla 
Source: OLAS and NIP 1996-2000 
1/ Scenario A: on-track IMF. RIP resources not included in NIP. 
21 No information available on sectoral distribution of micro-projects for EDF 6 and 7.  We allocated the entire amount to agricu 
Note: The sectoral allocation in this table has  been prepared by the consultants using project information 
from the On-Line Accounting System (for EDF 6 and 7).  Structural adjustment and Stabex are included as 
sectors  for  presentational  purposes - it  is  not always  possible to  allocate these  resources to  sectors  (see 
Understanding European Community Aid, ODI 1997). 
The decline in NIP disbursements (see Figure 5) is explained by the completion of most 
works under IRP-1 in the mid 1990s and delays in the implementation of IRP-ll. 
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Figure  5  - Payments  by  Instrument  (EDF  4-7) 
B.  InStitutional Arrangements 
Aid  implementation  in Tanzania is  characterised  by  the  very  low capacity  of local 
counterparts_ .  As  noted  by  Helleiner,  "The  current  weakness  of  the  public 
administration has a long history.  Among  its causes were the numerous  institutional 
and  administrative  changes  considered  necessary  to  promote  rapid  socialist 
development in  the late  1960s and the  l970s."
46
•  . 
The protracted economic crisis and  the  structural adjustment process  have also taken 
their  toll  in  the  civil service  by ,  reducing  the  remuneration  (particularly  of  senior 
staff) and by  reducing operational budgets for many key  ministries. The Civil Service 
Reform Programme was pegun in  1991  but has progressed slowly.  Until recently,  the 
emphasis appears to  have been more on the reduction of the size of the Civil Service, 
and less on  improving  efficiency or delivering ·better service. As  recently as  1995,  a 
m~ssion for the Nordic Initiative for Assistance to the Civil Service found few  signs of 
commitment to  the civil service reform  p~ocess. 
International  aid  appears  to  have  overwhelmed  the  limited  capacity  of  the 
Governmem.  In  the  implementation  of  their  projects,  donors  have  frequently 
designed  implementation  arrangements  that  bypass  the.  Government's  capacity, 
through:  (a)  payment  of supplements  or consultancies  to  some  civil  servants;  (b) 
creation of parallel structures or units  for  the implementation of their  projects;  and 
(c)  provision  of  long  term  ("substitution")  Technical  Assistance  to  Government 
departments.  All of these strategies create significant problems.  The  first  one  can 
lead to  donor competition and the  fragmentation  of the civil service while ownership 
may  be compromised. The second overlooks the fact that parallel structures  still need 
to  interact with the  Government system  but  have  no  leverage  on  it,  while  the  third 
does  not  support  sustainable  capacity.  The  training  component  in  these  T A 
programmes is usually weak. 
46  Helleiner et aL.  ibidem. 
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Donors use these arrangements because of concerns about the efficient implementation 
of their projects.  However, the weaknesses of these approaches are widely recognised 
(DAC Guidelines for the Effectiveness of Aid, OECD,  1992). While the support to the 
Civil Service Reform in Tanzania appears to be a more sustainable approach, donors are 
aware of its difficulties. However, some donors (e.g. Nordic countries) have called for a 
"mainstreaming"  of  project  management,  based  on  the  integration  of  project 
management functions within the civil service. 
Institutional arrangements are, therefore, difficult for most donors operating in Tanzania. 
In the case of the EC. the Programme Support Unit (Chapter m  was to support the NAO 
and the administration of EDF funded interventions.  However, it has faced difficulties 
in  carrying  out  its  functions  adequately.  As  a  unit  staffed  with  consultants  working 
exclusively  in  EC  programmes,  its  communication  with Government departments has 
sometimes been insufficient. 
47  Its  weakness in  accounting and fmancial controls might 
have  affected  the  monitoring  of some  EDF projects,  particularly  the  management of 
counterpart  funds.  In  the  case  of  the  SASP,  its  implementation  and  monitoring 
arrangements  were  weak.  Neither the  Government  nor the  EC  had  the  manpower to 
monitor such an ambitious programme. Eventually, the PSU was given the mandate for 
the monitoring of SASP.  Similar difficulties have been experienced in other sectors. 
In  the  transport  sector,  the  main  problem  has  been  the  frequent  changes  in  the 
institutional  set-up  and  the  fragmented  distribution  of  responsibilities.  This  has 
contributed to slow decision making and very little accountability in the sector (see Box 
4 for details).  The implementation agency for EC funded projects has been the MOW, 
however its capacity has  been  affected by  the  implementation structures mentioned in 
Box4. 
According to the Helleiner report, parallel management structures are coupled with the 
proliferation of donor entry points (including local governments and communities and 
NGOs). In  some cases, donors' difficulties with the Government have led to the use of 
NGOs as implementing agents.  However, the difficulties in co-ordinating NGOs should 
also be considered (there are over 8,000 NGOs in Tanzania). 
47 The implementation unit of the Human Resource Development Programme is also located in the PSU. In 
this case an implementation unit of a project reports to another implementation unit. It appears that a foreign 
consultant reports to a local consultant (Technical Co-ordinator of the PSU). 
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Box 4: Ever-Changing and Complex Institutional Arrangements'for,the Integrated  · 
R08ds Project  ·  , · · - -:··::~;-~.:::- -y •·  -
A.  Responsible Ministry 
•v 
-The Ministry of  Works and the Ministcy of  CommUnications and TranSPort-were merged 8nd $pllt 
four times in less than 15 years:  · - ·  ,  , 
1984  Ministries of Works and Transport merged into· Ministry of  CommUnications and Works 
(MCW)  - ·,  .-_-,- .. 
1991  MCW  split  into  Ministry  of Works  {MOW)  and  Ministry  of Colllllll1nication$  and 
Transport (MCT)  ~  ".  .~'  :~:--· '>  ~ ,/  :.....  ·  ~ 
1993  MOW  and MCf merged  into  the  Ministry of WorJcs.··CommUnicaHons:·:-aiut  TranspOrt 
(MWCf)  .  - . 
1995  MWCT split again into MOW and MCf.  l_-
- ~  '  ·.  .  .  -.  . ,  __ ·  _,.  :,  __  _;,_:_~<  _.,  -..  : ,•.  ,_  -, 
A recent evaluation 48 found  that 
4'the Ministry of Works  seems to  h•ve~t>eCn~:Wider conStant 
transfonnation over the last decade and it is diffiCult to find an oigainiSaiionafplan: which can be 
said  to  be completely  up  to  date:' _It  should  also  be  noted  that  th~f~i~~~t:Jj:o~;:Worb is 
responsible  only  for  trunk  roads  and' regional  roads.  ·While'  the-~-PriniC:'_).f~~:--omce ---
responsiblefordistrictroads.  ·  ·  - ·  -·-- ·-.  - ..  '.>,:<":-;:.'- ~'--~·f  ·  _.,-
.  --
B.  Implementing Agency 
'  "  ~ '..,...  .  . ' 
•-;>'''~'":.:.'·. <  {._.-.. ~~-'  ._.,~  ~  ~-- ;  ........ v  ••  >: 
Over time  15  units  have been created to work ·on the implementation of IRP, mostly based on 
recommendations by the World Bank and focusing on its components.  These include: 
./  Co-ordination Office for Donor Assisted Projects (CODAP) 
./  National Tender Committee (NTC) 
./  Plant & Equipment Hire Company Ltd. (PEHCOL) 
./  Regional Tender Boards (RTB) 
./  Contracts Control Unit (CCU) 
./  Road Maintenance Initiative Unit (RMI) 
u  .:: 
./  Works Inspectorate (WI) 
·~>-"-
./  Management Action Group (MAG) 
., 
./  Women's Participation Unit (WPU) 
./  Road Safety Unit (RSU) 
./  Appropriate Technology Unit (A  TU) 
./  Village Transport & Travel Unit (VITP) 
./  Information Technology Centre (ITC) 
./  Procurement Management Unit (PMU) 
./  Bridges Unit (BU) 
The  introduction  of IR.P  increased  the  contracts  workload  of the  Ministry of Works from· 5 
contracts a year til11990 to &0 contracts from 1991.  Each procurement decision involved 5everal 
-offices andmmy·ofthe above units  wi:thln·the~·Ministry-ofWorkS: ·  ·~- --~·-:.:· :'"'__·  ::_- ->,: 
· Office/Unit 
PenmwnentStcreauy 
ccu 
PMU 
CODAP 
NTC 
Others 
Total 
48 Carl Bro. IRP Review, 1997. 
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No. of  Steps Involved ,  v,  _ 
Services 
6 
4-
5 
9 
2 
25 
51-
, Works 
'  ·- -_6 
. ,,,  6 
.  :•_  :,  -•f.o>.<.'6:  ·_-_;. 
,',,  ,··,  · ..... 
- ·_  ·<.:-·  8:  __  :··. 
. ·.:  --L_.>·· 
___ ,  34- :;·.  _;_.·  ,• 
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C.  Programme and Project Cycle Management 
Project Preparation. 
The successful introduction of the Project Cycle Management and the logical framework 
to  EDF  interventions  has  done  much  to  improve  project  preparation  in  the  EC. 
However,  in  the  difficult institutional context of Tanzania,  there are  still a few  areas 
where  more  improvements  are  needed  in  project  preparation.  A  recent  capacity 
assessment study on Tanzania 
49 found that "too much of the initiative in the selection 
and design of government projects lies with the donors."  As a consequence projects are 
often designed by  donor staff or consultants that are insufficiently familiar with local 
conditions.  Moreover, insufficient Government co-ordination leads to a situation where 
donors  sometimes  work  at  cross- purposes  and  in  competition  with  each  other. 
Evaluations by Member States often reached similar conclusions:  "Country programme 
planning remains a strongly donor-driven process.  The policy consultations hardly leave 
room for a dialogue about policy options and priorities in the development cooperation 
programme." 
50 
The introduction of the logical framework approach has improved the preparation 
of EC projects.  In the transport sector, there has been an observable improvement in 
the  quality of financing proposals, in  part the  result of the introduction of a transport 
manual.  The  1994 transport evaluation 
51  noted that many fmancing proposals did not 
include  economic  and  financial  analysis  and  recommended  the  introduction  of the 
logical  framework  approach  and  simple  5  years  monitoring  schedules.  These 
recommendations  have  been  followed  in  more  recent  transport  projects  such  as 
RUSIRM.  The Financing Agreement of RUSIRM  spells out the monitoring indicators 
and reporting procedures in a logical framework.  Monitoring formats are also included 
in  the  Implementation  Agreement  and  biannual  audits  by  an  independent  auditing 
company  were  made  mandatory.  In  the  transport  sector,  recent  projects  have  also 
become  more  specific  on  policy  conditions,  for  example,  RUSIRM  contains detailed 
specific conditions and  measures  to  support the  transport policy dialogue (e.g.  use of 
proceeds from the Road Fund, establishment of a Roads Agency, adequate maintenance 
of roads).  In structural adjustment, the difficulties with the first two SASPs led to a 
very detailed implementation agreement for SASP 3 that included a log-frame. However, 
the  programme  was  overly  ambitious  and  the  implementation  timetable could  not  be 
followed.  The implementation agreement was replaced in December 1997. 
In  some  cases,  the  EC  allocates  insufficient  manpower  resources  for  project 
preparation  and  this  lin1its  the  possibility  of Government  participation  in  the 
process.  However,  Government  participation  is  also  limited  by  its  capacity 
constraints.  In structural adjustment, Government often has  insufficient manpower 
to  examine EC  programme and conditionalities in  detailed.  This has also affected the 
nature  of conditionalities  (too  many  and  not  well  defined)  and  the  ownership of the 
SASP TA programme of budget support (Treasury and Prime Ministers' Office). 
The initial design of SASP was  innovative and focused  on  a key priority area (social 
sector  budgeting).  However,  time  and  manpower  constraints  of EC  officials  in  the 
preparation  phase  resulted  in  limited  co-ordination  with  the  Government,  and  in  an 
underestimation of the difficulties involved in  managing the SASP and monitoring its 
49 The World Bank, Study on Capacity Building in Tanzania, draft, 1998. 
50  Operations  Review  Unit,  Ministry  of Foreign  Affairs,  Evaluation  of the  Netherlands  Development 
Programme with Tanzania,  1970-1992, 1994, pp. 103. 
51  TecnEcon, Tanzania Transport Sector Evaluation, 1994. 
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assumptions.  The  preparation  of similar  operations  by  other donors  would  nonnally 
require  a  larger  project  preparation  team  (both  officials  and  consultants).  Similarly, 
other donors  would  require  a  stronger process of quality  control and peer review of 
project documents  5
2
• The education sector development programme was also prepared 
with minimal manpower compare to similar operations by other donors (for example, the 
DFID education intervention).  In  the transport sector, the IRP was carried out in co-
ordination  with  other  donors  and  therefore  EC  manpower  constraints  were  less  in 
evidence.  However, the Government institutional capacity was insufficient to cope with 
all the demands of IRP preparation. 
In common with most other donors in Tanzania, the assumptions made during project 
preparation are often over-optimistic. In the transport sector, the assumption that T  A 
in  itself  (mostly  under  the  World  Bank  component)  was  going  to  succeed  in 
strengthening Government institutions in  the sector, underestimated the difficulties of 
institutional  support programmes in  Africa. In  the  railway sector the EC interventions 
evaluated  in  1994 
53  were  judged  only  partially  effective  due  to  over-optimistic 
assumptions  about  traffic  and  revenue  increases  to  follow  from  the  projects.  These 
assumptions  underestimated  the  management  constraints  of the  Tanzanian  Railways 
Corporation. Similarly, the SASP goal of improving social sector budgeting was overly 
dependent on  the Government remaining "on-track" in the refonn program, the overall 
budgetary process being improved, Civil  Service refonn improving sectoral capacities 
and the existence of social sector strategies and effective donor co-ordination. 
In some cases, project preparation in the roads sector has been long.  Table 8 shows 
that  for  the  3  projects  that  we  reviewed,  the  total  preparation  time  exceeded  the 
maximum delays  recorded by  the  Price Waterhouse evaluation in  1992. 
54  However, 
there are  a number of explanations for  these delays.  For example, in  the case of the 
Musoma-Sirari Road,  the delays  can  be  partly attributed to  the regional aspect of the 
road  and  the  need  to  obtain  approval  for  the  Kenya  section.  While  the  delay  in 
RUSIRM can  be partly explained by  the innovative character of its new  'maintenance 
programme' approach 
Implementation 
As  with most donors in  Tanzania, it appears that many EC projects have suffered from 
delays  in  implementation. A check of three EC  transport projects, using the reference 
time limits set out in the detailed evaluation by Price Waterhouse in 1992 (see Table 8), 
next page, shows that these projects experienced delays longer than the reference limits. 
Procurement was subject to  significant delays. It  is  possibly as a response to the delays 
in  procurement that works  contracts in  the  roads  sector were highly concentrated in  a 
few companies (EDF 4-7).
55 
52  Although the recent introduction of the Quality Support Group is  an attempt to  improve through peer 
review  the quality of financing proposals. 
53  Tanzania Transport Sector Evaluation, Tecnecon, June 1994 
54  Study  of the  Causes  of Delay  in  the  Implementation  of Financial and Technical  Cooperation,  Price 
Waterhouse, 1992 
55  The  concentration  of contracts  may  also  reflect  the  costs  for  companies  of establishing  activities  in 
Tanzania. 
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Table 8 - Delays in Project Processing and Implementation: A Comparison with 
thP"  Wth  R  rt  e  nee  a er ouse  e >O 
Phase  Price Waterhouse Report  Road Projects 
Thnc Limits (months)  (6th aDd 7th EDF) . 
Ref.  Max. value of  lbanda- Musoma  ..  . RUvmJia..S. 
delay  Uyole  Sirarl  . '. lringa  ,, 
A.  Project  Preparation  6  19  8  24  29 
(preparation  of  financing 
proposal to signing of financing 
agreement) 
Drawing up financing proposal  2  6  2  17  18 
Approval of financing proposal  2  10  3  5  5 
Signing of financing agreement  2  3  3  2  6 
B. Awarding of contracts (under 
Restricted IT) 
Supervising consultant (total)  16.5  41.5  - 20.5  30 
(as of Mar 98) 
Prepare dossier - tenders made  11.5  22.5  - 18 
Evaluation to approval  3  8  - 1 
Approval - contract signed  2  11  - 1.5 
Contractor  20  46 
Prepare dossier- tenders made  14  26  12 56  18 
I  I  Evaluation to approval  4  15  3  1 
I Approval - contract signed  2  5  3  7 
Procurement  delays  in  transport  projects  are  also  common  to  many  other donors,  as 
shown  by  a  comparison  of procurement  of goods  under the  Railways  Restructuring 
Programme  (Table 9). 
Table 9: Procurement of Goods by Selected Aid Agencies Supporting RRP 
No. of  Avge. Size. 
Aid Agency  Contracts  Min. Time  Max. Time  of  Contract· 
18 
2 
10 
-
-
-
..  ~  ..  ·(months)·-
"  (months)·  (US$'000)  · 
African Development Bank  4  5  44  876 
World Bank  5  10  23  138 
European Commission  8  11  21  947 
Source: TRC 
The delays in  procurement are shared by  the World Bank.  A recent evaluation found 
that procurement of World Bank components under IRP had taken an average of 189 
weeks for civil works and 90 weeks for consultancy services, against the project target 
56  Revision of  tender dossier (launched in April  1991).  Original tender in 1988 , based on design done in 
1986, failed because bids were twice as high as estimated cost 
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of approximately 80 weeks for civil works and 30 weeks for consultants. 
57 Given that  · 
the World Bank uses the Government's systems, this delay can be partly attributed to the 
problems with these systems (51 steps were required to procure services and 61  steps for 
works).  However, these delays are mostly explained by the significant increase in the 
workload of the Ministry of Works. 
In Tanzania, road projects financed by most donors are subject to significant delays and 
cost overruns.  Table 10 shows some of the reasons behind these delays for three EC 
road projects.  These road project can point to major factors causing cost ovenuns, such 
as  variations in fuel  price, exchange rate, design changes, and unforeseen intenuptions 
(e.g. refugee influx).  In the absence of detailed evaluations, it is difficult to establish the 
extent to which cost overruns might have been due to mismanagement or conuption. 
Table 10- Main Reasons for Delays/Cost Overruns in a Sample of Road Projects 
Project 
lbanda·Uyole 
Kobero-
Nyakasanza 
Musoma-
Sirari 
Cost(MECU) 
r-------.,.---1 
Planned  Revi 
19 
(of  which, 
9  was  co-
financed by 
Dutch) 
26.5 
48 
sed 
23.5 
30.5 
54 
Main reasons for delay/cost overrun  Comment 
· delays  in  mobilisation  by contractor 
(work started almost one year late) 
· mainly due to extra time needed for 
modified  pavement  design  (  4.4 
MECU),  due  to  adverse  subsoil 
conditions  not  foreseen  in  original 
contract 
also  reconstruction  of  collapsed 
bridge due to heavy rains 
· cost variations (2.8 MECU) and extra 
security costs  (0.2  MECU)  related  to 
10  month (approved) extension, given 
because of heavy refugee  influx  from 
Rwanda in 1994 
·  extra  bridgeworks  (0.4  MECU)  -
design was inadequate (and, contractor 
staff lacked experience in such work) 
·mainly due to substantial variations in 
prices  - fuel,  labour  and  cement 
(exceeded tender amount by 525%) 
·some additional works 
poor  supervising 
consultant 
Court  of  Auditors 
queried  lack  of  action 
against supervisors (also 
responsible  for  poor 
design)  despite 
«Sufficient  scope  for 
corrective action». 
·  «breach  of  contract» 
dispute  (still  ongoing) 
as  contractor  went 
beyond  10  month 
extension period; 
·  delays  also  related  to 
sour  relations  between 
contractor  and 
inexperienced 
subcontractor; 
· biggest price variation 
was fuel cost; as  well as 
quantity  increases,  the 
diesel price increased by 
348%  whereas currency 
devaluation  was  only 
199% 
57  Comprehensive Review of  the Integrated Roads Project, Carl Bro, 1997 
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Implementation and monitoring of EC interventions has been affected by the extensive 
nature of EC ex ante financial controls. In this context, much less emphasis is given to 
monitoring project performance or to ex post financial audits.  In the transport sector, the 
projects we reviewed have not been audited recently.  Some projects have never been 
audited.  Financial audits could be also particularly useful in  other EC interventions, 
such  as  the  counterpart funds  of SASP,  where  the  nature  of the  ex ante  controls  in 
generally weaker. 
The EC  is  required  to  apply  ex  ante  financial  controls  without  selectivity.  This  is 
particularly onerous on Delegation staff which in many cases has to support the NAO 
office  (through  the  PSU)  in  fulfilling  EDF responsibilities.  A  change towards  more 
selectivity in  the application of these controls would save valuable EC staff time.  For 
example,  NIP projects under EDF6 and EDF7  required 844 procurement decisions
58
• 
However, only a third of this total number of procurement decisions, those above ECU 
100,000, explained 96% of the total value.  As economies of scale in procurement and 
disbursement  decisions  are  minimal,  a  move  towards  removing  ex ante  controls  for 
procurement  decisions  below  ECU  100,000,  while  extending  financial  audits  to  all 
expenditures under EDF funded programmes would save considerable staff time. 
In the roads sector a good example of this approach can be shown in the new Ruvuma 
and  Southern  Iringa  Road  Maintenance  Programme.  In  this  project,  procurement 
decisions below 250,000 ECU will be made by the implementing agency (the Ministry 
of Works) and paid using an  imprest account.  Replenishments of the imprest account 
will  be made half yearly subject to  full  audit reports from an independent auditor and 
Government fulfilling its committed contributions (i.e.  10% for rehabilitation and 90% 
for maintenance). 
The efficiency cost of extensive ex ante controls can also be seen in  the processing of 
payment  orders  for  every  expenditure.  Table 11  presents  a  very  simple  attempt  to 
estimate  the  staff  time  spent  processing  payment  order:  2.1  person  year  at  the 
Delegation and  1.4  at the NAO office.  This rough calculation also excludes the time 
spent by staff in Headquarters on direct payments. 
Table 11- Processing of Payment Orders 
Item  1997 
No.  of  payment  orders  processed  by  621 
Delegation (local and foreign) 
Person-days spent on POs 
59 by Delegation  466 
Person-days spent on POs by NAO Office  311 
Person Year S_Qent on POs 
60  3.5 
58  Delegated appropriations excluding Annual Work Programmes, advances on microprojects, Stabex, EIB 
risk  capital  and  interest  relief and  emergency  assistance,  all  of which  are  disbursed  in  one  tranche  or 
following accelerated procedures. 
59  Assuming  a very  conservative time  of six  hours  to:  (a)  prepare the  PO and  go  through  the  27  items 
contained in the checklist; (b) send to  Ministry of Finance (NAO) and follow up; (c) give it for signing to 
Head  of Delegation after the  adviser has  checked  it;  (d)  send the original either to  the  local  bank or to 
headquarters in Brussels.  We also assume that NAO office spends 4 hours on each  PO. 
60 Assuming 220 working days per year. 
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The extensive administrative burden of EC controls have reduced the Delegation staff 
time available to monitor the implementation of particularly complex programmes, such 
as the Structural Adjustment Support Programme . 
61  The SASP implementation has 
also been affected by the difficulties in the overall reform programme, by its programme 
design and by  manpower constraints in the Government (and the EC). A complex and 
ambitious  programme  like  SASP  requires  strong,  specialised  resources  for 
implementation and monitoring.  SASP did not have such resources.  While the set-up of 
the  General  Import  Programme  was  very  efficient  and  flexible,  the  management  of 
counterpart funds was  weaker.  The SASP contemplated regular transfers to the budget 
but SASP funds have often been used as emergency funds and occasionally targeted to 
specific  expenditures,  although  this  was  not  contemplated  in  the  implementation 
arrangements
62
.  Insufficiently  defined  conditionalities  for  the  release  of counterpart 
funds has affected monitoring and distracted valuable staff resources.  For example, the 
implementation  agreements  focused  on  the  need  to  protect  recurrent  non-salary 
expenditures and required a quarterly Expenditure Report on social sector budgets and 
expenditures.  However, although considerable effort was spent by the EC, the TA and 
the Government in producing these reports, they did not provide relevant information
63
• 
In  some  cases,  insufficiently  defined  conditionalities  have  also  contributed  to 
misunderstandings with the Government.  In  these circumstances, Government officials 
believe that SASP funds are an unreliable source of financing. 
In general, the shortage of resources for the implementation and monitoring of SASP has 
contributed  to  some  inefficiency  in  the  management  of counterpart  funds,  in  the 
management  of the  T  A  programme,  and  in  the  monitoring of programme  results  and 
assumptions.  Co-ordination  with  the  Government  and  other  donors  has  also  been 
affected.  In  the  light  of these  difficulties,  in  1996  the  PSU  was  put  in  charge  of 
monitoring the SASP. However, as noted before, the PSU itself have some institutional 
weaknesses. 
Evaluation 
Final evaluations are a  strength of EC aid. However, while some of the lessons of recent 
evaluations have been included in the Strategy Paper, it has been difficult to incorporate 
these  lessons  in  the  design  of new  operations.  The  SASPs  were  evaluated  in  early 
1996
64  and  it's the outcome  was  discussed  by  the  EC  but there  was  limited feedback 
from  the  Government  or  other  donors.  Following  the  evaluation,  the  EC  rejected 
proposals  from  the  T  A and  the  SASP Steering Group to  continue to  expand the  T  A 
budget  improvement  support  programme.  However,  the  draft  financial  proposal  of 
SASP 4 appears to face difficulties in incorporating  key lessons of the SASP evaluation. 
The most  recent evaluation of EDF projects  in  the  transport sector was  carried out in 
1994.  This  evaluation  did  not  identify  major  weaknesses.  Its  recommendations  on 
including a logical· framework and a monitoring plan  were followed in  recent projects 
such  as  Ruvuma and  Southern  Iringa Maintenance Programme.  The IRP programme 
was  evaluated  in  1997  on  behalf of the  World Bank but covering all  donor projects. 
This evaluation identified many of the institutional weaknesses of the IRP and has been 
widely discussed among IRP donors. 
61  This section is based on the 1996 SASP Evaluation, IDC. 
62  SASP  funds  have  financed  the  closure  of  the  shadow  programme  budget  (June,  1994)  and  the 
supplementary budge of November 1994.  SASP 3 has financed a retrenchment package (July 1996) and the 
payment of arrears in the education and health sectors (August 1997) 
63  The reports compared quarterly expenditure execution to the revised quarterly budgets.  Revised budgets 
are close to actual expenditures. 
64 SASP Operational Review and "Evaluation of the EU SASP Tanzania 1992-1995", IDC. July 1996. 
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There is  a backlog in  post-project evaluations, while many mid-term reviews have not 
been carried out. During 1997, only four evaluations were carried out. 
D.  Technical Assistance 
Technical assistance has assumed a growing importance in EC aid to  Tanzania, rising 
from 15% to 22% of total delegated appropriations between EDF 6 and 7 (see Figure 6). 
This proportion ofT  A to total aid is in line with those of other donors assisting Tanzania 
(20% of estimated net ODA to Tanzania from all sources 
65
). 
Figure 6: Delegated Appropriations for TA and Consultancies 
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Tanzania  has  received  large  amounts  of technical  assistance  over  the  years,  but  its 
impact  seems  to  have  been  limited.  As  noted  by  a  recent  Capacity  Building  study, 
"excessive use of TA and detailed controls over implementation of projects ( ...  ) results 
from  lack of trust of the competence and probity of Tanzanian institutions."
66  In  the 
institutional TA to the roads sector, where the EC has only been a minor donor, the 1997 
evaluation of IRP 
67  found that, despite over 320 man-years of technical assistance under 
IRP-I, the institutional improvement strategy had not been successful. 
"a main reason for the apparent low impact of  the institutional support 
under /RP-1  is  that there  seems not to  have been an  overall and co-
ordinated plan for the provision of inputs and that too many activities 
65  Gerald  K.  Helleiner et al.,  Report of the  Group of Independent Advisers on Development Cooperation 
Issues between Tanzania and its Aid Donors, June 1995, p.  16. 
66 The World Bank, Study on Capacity Building in Tanzania, draft, 1998. 
67  Carl  Bra  International,  Comprehensive  Review  of the  !.oztegrated  Roads  Project,  Final  Report,  draft, 
August 1997, p.  17. 
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have been starter on donor initiative without sufficient consensus about 
objectives and continued ownership in the organisation. " 
The difficulties in  donors' Technical Assistance programmes in Tanzania are linked to 
Government's  limited  capacity  to  manage  and  monitor  these  programmes.  In  many 
cases,  the  T  A  is  perceived  by  Government as  an  additional  conditionality of an  aid 
package  and  is  not  adequately  managed  or supervised.  In  this  context,  while  T  A  is 
nominally provided to  support the  Government,  in  many cases (given  the Delegation 
staffing constraints), the TA is  more effective in  supporting central EC activities. This 
dual responsibility (Government and EC) can often compromise the effectiveness of the 
T A in building capacity in the Government. 
In the  case of SASP,  the  TA programme  had  two  components:  budget  improvement 
support  programme  (Treasury  and  Prime  Minister's  Office)  and  support  to  the 
introduction  of VA r'
8
.  The  T  A  in  the  Treasury  was  introduced  without  sufficient 
consultation  with  the  Government  and  it  did  not  integrate  well  with  Government 
structures.  However,  it  provided significant support  to  the  Delegation.  With  limited 
supervision, the T  A programme was extended to  the Prime Minister's Office.  In  this 
case,  the  programme  was  run  through  a  special  unit financed  by  the EC and outside 
normal Government structures.  In both cases support to Government capacity appears to 
have been very limited. 
In the recent Education Sector Development Programme, given capacity constraints in 
the Delegation, a T  A belonging to another EC project had to play the role of monitoring 
the programme for the Government and also assisting the Delegation (including its role 
as co-ordinator of Member States' activities in the sector).  In practice, it would appear 
that this duality of roles impinged on the effectiveness of theTA's activities. 
In a few cases the problem of duality of TA roles (Government and EC) appears to have 
been overcome.  For example, in  the Roads Sector, it would appear that the EC's TA 
programme supporting the Ministry of Works is  well integrated into the ministry, while 
at  the  same  time  supports  the  Delegation's'  understanding  of  transport  sector 
developments. 
68 This programme is implemented by Crown Agents and appears to be adequately managed. 
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